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ARTICLES 
 
NCAA AS STATE ACTOR CONTROVERSY: 
MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING 
JOSEPHINE (JO) R. POTUTO* 
ABSTRACT 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
affords procedural due process, equal protection, and substantive bill of rights 
protections.  It applies to state actors, not private ones.  The National 
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) is an association of colleges and 
universities that regulates intercollegiate athletics.  It is a private actor.  Even 
though private, entities on occasion have been “deemed” state actors by the 
Supreme Court of the United States.  The NCAA so far is not one of them. 
An eminent baseball philosopher—the “old perfessor,” Casey Stengel—1 
once sagely advised, “Never make predictions, especially about the future.”2  
Casey was right.  Predictions are perilous, the more so if recorded.  But as to 
what would ensue were the Supreme Court to deem the NCAA a state actor, 
predictions abound. 
NCAA adversaries and supporters alike predict that state actor status will 
mean major changes to the way the NCAA operates; they just disagree 
whether that would be a good thing.  Adversaries see a contemptuous and 
 
*  Josephine (Jo) R. Potuto is the Richard H. Larson Professor of Constitutional Law at the 
University of Nebraska College of Law.  She also is the University’s Faculty Athletic Representative 
(FAR) at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln (UNL), a required position at all NCAA member 
institutions.  Potuto served nine years on the NCAA Division I Committee on Infractions (two as vice 
chair and two as chair).  Among other NCAA service, for more than four years Potuto was one of 
three Big 12 Conference representatives on the Division I Management Council, including service on 
both its Legislative Review and Administrative Review Subcommittees. 
1.  Casey Stengel was a journeyman baseball player and subsequently the successful manager of 
the New York Yankees from 1949 to 1960.  He was famous for the unique style—Stengelese—in 
which he imparted his nuggets of wisdom. 
2.  Steve Rushin, Gene Genies, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 29, 2011, at 13; see also Stewart J. 
Schwab, Predicting the Future of Employment Law: Reflecting or Refracting Market Forces?, 76 
IND. L.J. 29, 29–30 (2001) (noting that when predicting the future “one is either vague and 
conventional, or specific and demonstrably wrong”). 
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overreaching “monopoly” NCAA3 held in check, with student-athletes and 
others able successfully to challenge it in court.  Supporters see an 
undermining of the NCAA’s ability to maintain an even playing field in 
competition and to effect compliance with bylaws and policies duly adopted by 
member institutions.  Per contra.  The only clear consequence to the NCAA’s 
regulatory authority over intercollegiate athletics attendant on NCAA state 
actor status would be to end or at least cabin NCAA bylaws and policies that 
accord preferential treatment to women and racial and ethnic minorities.  In 
all other ways, the NCAA might well be able to proceed as usual.  In this 
article I discuss why.4 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
For competitors and fans alike, athletics competition has to be fair and, 
well, competitive.  There are obvious reasons why the Class A Great Lakes 
Loons5 and the New York Yankees compete in different leagues and why the 
number of points awarded per football touchdown is independent of which 
team scores it.  When competition progresses beyond informal pickup games, 
extends to large numbers of teams and games, and anticipates crowning a 
champion, then an organizing entity is needed not only for scheduling and 
other administrative matters but also to articulate and enforce rules for 
competition and competitors.6  For intercollegiate athletics, that entity is the 
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA).7 
 
3.  The most recent such critic is Taylor Branch.  See generally Taylor Branch, The Shame of 
College Sports, ATLANTIC, Oct. 2011, at 80. 
4.  The title of this article, obviously, is borrowed from William Shakespeare.  I owe its genesis 
to two long-time colleagues.  Harvey Perlman, now the UNL chancellor and formerly a member of 
the NCAA Division I Board of Directors, wondered whether the NCAA should be characterized as 
private when so many of its members are state institutions and when non-members, in particular 
student-athletes, appear to be indentured to policies they have no hand in developing.  Bob Works 
reads widely in disciplines outside his own and pointed me to the wealth of material on the 
private/public dichotomy as it pertains, in particular, to local government and land use law.  Steve 
Willborn and Rick Duncan read drafts of this article.  Their teaching and research interests—spanning 
education law, labor law, constitutional law, administrative law, and statutory discrimination law—
helped me to think through content and thesis. 
5.  A list of minor league baseball clubs, including the Class A Great Lake Loons, may be found 
at Teams by Affiliation, MILB.COM, http://www.milb.com/milb/info/affiliations.jsp (last visited Oct. 
29, 2012). 
6.  I have elsewhere discussed the additional roles that colleges and universities need the NCAA 
to play.  Josephine R. Potuto, The NCAA Rules Adoption, Interpretation, Enforcement and Infractions 
Processes: The Laws that Regulate Them and the Nature of Court Review, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. 
L. 257, 262–63 (2010). 
7.  The National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics (NAIA) also administers varsity 
athletics competition for four-year institutions.  About the NAIA, NAIA, http://www.naia.org/ 
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The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
regulates the actions of state actors, not private ones.8  It requires state actors 
to provide individuals equal protection of the laws and procedural due process 
when their life, liberty, or property may be abridged.9  Through the doctrine of 
incorporation, the Fourteenth Amendment also requires that state actors 
provide substantive protections found in the Bill of Rights.10 
The NCAA is an unincorporated private association of four-year colleges 
and universities,11 not a state agency that “assert[s] sovereign authority” over 
individuals.12  Primarily to achieve broad implementation of constitutional 
mandates to eliminate racial discrimination,13 the Supreme Court has included 
 
ViewArticle.dbml?DB_OEM_ID=27900&ATCLID=205323019 (last visited Oct. 29, 2012).  Its 
members typically are part of a state college system with smaller student enrollments than NCAA 
Division I institutions.  They are not major research universities with PhD programs and they do not 
sponsor high-powered football and men's basketball teams.  A list of NAIA members may be found at 
Member Schools, NAIA, http://www.naia.org/ViewArticle.dbml?DB_OEM_ID=27900 
&ATCLID=205322922 (last visited Oct. 29, 2012). 
8.  See generally The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 
Pet.) 243 (1833).  For a discussion of the private and public dichotomy in the context of 
geographically-bounded communities such as cities and housing associations, see generally Robert C. 
Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519 (1982), Richard A. Epstein, 
Covenants and Constitutions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 906 (1988); Lee Ann Fennell, Properties of 
Concentration, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1227 (2006), Gerald E. Frug, Cities and Homeowners 
Associations: A Reply, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1589 (1982), and Richard C. Schragger, The Limits of 
Localism, 100 MICH. L. REV. 371 (2001).  One area of contention is the extent to which housing 
associations may be described as voluntary groupings.  The more that a housing association is formed 
through choice, with full opportunity for entry and exit, the greater the deference to rules and policies.  
See, e.g., Schragger, supra, at 386–416.  For an argument that due process protections should be 
afforded to adversarial hearings when private parties do state business, see generally Paul R. Verkuil, 
Privatizing Due Process, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 963 (2005). 
9.  The Fourteenth Amendment also guarantees the privileges and immunities of United States 
citizens and the right of national and state citizenship to anyone born or naturalized in the United 
States and subject to its jurisdiction. 
10.  See generally, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 
U.S. 319 (1937), overruled on other grounds by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). 
11.  2009–10 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL § 4.02.1 [hereinafter NCAA BYLAWS].  NCAA 
members also are the athletics conferences to which member colleges and universities belong. 
12.  See NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 197 (1988).  The United States Olympic Committee 
(USOC) also is a private, not state, actor even though it is incorporated by federal charter, coordinates 
international amateur athletics competition in the United States, and represents the United States on 
the International Olympic Committee.  S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 
522, 542–43 (1987).  The USOC has delegated to the National Governing Bodies (NGBs) for each 
sport the administration of national amateur competition in that sport and the selection of athletes to 
represent the sport in international amateur competition.  NGBs also are not state actors.  See, e.g., 
Behagen v. Amateur Basketball Ass’n , 884 F.2d 524, 530–31 (10th Cir. 1989). 
13.  See, e.g., Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. 12 F.3d 388, 392 (2d Cir. 1993), rev’d on 
other grounds, 513 U.S. 374 (1995); Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 405–06 (2d Cir. 1975); 
Wahba v. N.Y. Univ., 492 F.2d 96, 101(2d Cir. 1974); JONATHAN D. VARAT ET AL., 
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as state actors private entities that perform a traditional state function;14 whose 
particular conduct is state-enforced, state-financed, directly state-endorsed or  
-coerced;15 or that are so pervasively entwined with a particular state’s 
activities that the state and ostensibly private actor have a “largely overlapping 
identity.”16  In NCAA v. Tarkanian, the Supreme Court held that the NCAA 
was a private, not state, actor under its articulated tests.17 
The arguments for and against state actor status for the NCAA’s 
regulation of intercollegiate athletics focus less on a black letter rule 
enunciation of what should make a private actor subject to constitutional 
mandates and more on a seat-of-the-pants perception of circumstances, 
equities, and consequences.  The arguments for state actor status go like this: 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1209 (13th ed. 2009); see also David S. Elkind, 
Note, State Action: Theories for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Private Activity, 74 COLUM. 
L. REV. 656, 661 (1974).  Almost all state actor cases were decided between 1945 and 1970.  See 
VARAT ET AL., supra, at 1209.  They had their genesis in Texas cases involving primary elections of 
the Democratic Party from which racial minorities were excluded.  See generally, e.g., Terry v. 
Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 
73 (1932).  The next type of case involved judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants, 
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), or damages, Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).  The 
expansion into subject areas less easy to show underlying principle began with Burton v. Wilmington 
Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961). 
14.  See generally, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (describing the impact of parks 
in relation to state actors); Smith, 321 U.S. 649 (describing the role of primary elections to state 
actors); Republic Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 570 F.2d 467, 470 n.4 (3d Cir. 1978) 
(describing company towns as state actors); SAUL ALINSKY, JOHN L. LEWIS: AN UNAUTHORIZED 
BIOGRAPHY 8–9 (1949); HOWARD B. LEE, BLOODLETTING IN APPALACHIA (1969) (describing the 
domination of coal companies over West Virginia towns).  The operation of company towns clearly 
fits within the line of cases that include as state action private action that constitutes traditional public 
function.  Today, company town conduct would be inconceivable, even treated as private actor 
conduct, both because the employment contract would be unenforceable as a contract of adhesion and 
because such contract terms would never be part of a collective bargaining agreement. 
15.  See generally, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 
457 U.S. 922 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 
(1967); Evans, 382 U.S. 296 (describing the effect of racially discriminatory charitable trusts on the 
state actor analysis); Burton, 365 U.S. 715; Shelley, 334 U.S. 1 (describing the effect of restrictive 
covenants on the state actor analysis). 
16.  Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n (Brentwood I), 531 U.S. 288, 303 
(2001).  The Court distinguished the Tennessee high school association from the NCAA on the 
ground that all its members were within the boundary of one state and virtually all were public.  
Before Brentwood I, state-wide high school athletics associations already were treated as state actors 
under state law in nine states (Indiana, Mississippi, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Arizona, Illinois, 
Missouri, Louisiana, and Oklahoma).  Id. at 294 n.1. 
17.  See generally Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179.  The Brentwood I Supreme Court held that state 
high school athletics associations, whose members all are within the boundaries of one state, could be 
seen as acting for and with a state in ways that a multi-state NCAA could not.  Brentwood I, 531 U.S. 
at 298. 
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 Even though most NCAA members are private,18 the NCAA 
nonetheless should be a state actor because the overwhelming 
majority of institutions in its most attention-getting division and 
subdivision are public.19  Its Division I (DI) sponsors the hugely 
popular and hugely profitable20 NCAA men’s basketball 
tournament, and it has nearly twice as many public as compared to 
private colleges and universities.21  Its DI Football Bowl 
Subdivision (FBS) includes the biggest spending athletics 
departments,22 prime targets of public, media, and government 
criticism,23 and it has 103 public institutions and only 17 private 
ones.24 
 The NCAA should be a state actor because it is big, national, and 
powerful.  It is the face of college athletics,25 and, for FBS 
institutions in particular, it effectively is “the only game in 
town.”26 
 
18.  The most recent year for which data are reported is 2009–10.  In that year, 610 of 1075 
NCAA institutions were private.  NCAA, 2009–10 NCAA MEMBERSHIP REPORT 15, 17, 21 (2010) 
[hereinafter NCAA MEMBER REPORT]. 
19.  The NCAA is divided into three divisions and three subdivisions within Division I (the 
Football Bowl, Football Championship, and Division I Subdivisions).  The Division I Subdivision 
does not sponsor football. 
20.  The contract is worth nearly $11 billion over fourteen years.  Steve Wieberg & Michael 
Hiestand, NCAA Seals New Deal with CBS, Turner for 68-Team Tournament, USA TODAY (Apr. 23, 
2010), http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/mensbasketball/2010-04-22-ncaa-tournament-cbs-
turner-agreement_N.htm. 
21.  There are 223 public and 114 private colleges and universities in DI.  NCAA MEMBER 
REPORT, supra note 18, at 15. 
22.  The median 2010 athletics revenue for institutions in the FBS was $48,298,000; in the 
Football Championship Subdivision (FCS) it was $13,189,000; in the non-football DI Subdivision it 
was $11,077,000.  NCAA, REVENUES AND EXPENSES 2004–2010 17 (2011).  Median 2010 expenses, 
respectively, were $46,688,000, $13,091,000, and $11,562,000.  Id.  The largest 2010 revenue of any 
college or university was $143,555,000 in the FBS, $40,186,000 in the FCS, and $32,098,000 in the 
NFS.  Id. at 19; See Eric Crawford, A National “Breaking Point”: Most Universities Help Pay for 
Athletics, but as Budgets Tighten It’s Unclear How Long It Will Last, COURIER-J. (Louisville), Dec. 
3, 2011, at Sports. 
23.  See Potuto, supra note 6, at 261. 
24.  NCAA MEMBER REPORT, supra note 18, at 15. 
25.  See Cureton v. NCAA, 37 F. Supp. 2d 687, 701 (E.D. Pa. 1999), rev’d, 198 F.3d 107 (3d 
Cir. 1999) (“It is well established that the NCAA has become an indelible institution of intercollegiate 
athletics.”). 
26.  MATTHEW MITTEN ET AL., SPORTS LAW AND REGULATION: CASES, MATERIALS, AND 
PROBLEMS 237 (2d ed. 2009).  See NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 198 n.19 (1988).  No doubt an 
institution can withdraw from the NCAA, but short of getting a critical mass cohort also to withdraw, 
it will find no athletics association that provides the same level of competition for its teams as that 
provided by the NCAA.  Id. 
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 The NCAA should be a state actor because its decisions have a 
substantial adverse impact on non-members, especially the 
student-athletes who compete at member institutions and the 
coaches who are employed by them, yet as non-members they 
have no role in adopting or changing NCAA bylaws and policies 
that affect them.27 
There are two primary, and related, arguments made by those on the other 
side: 
 The NCAA should not be a state actor because such status would 
upend the law governing private associations by permitting non-
members to advance their agendas against the right of members of 
an association to chart their own course.28 
 The NCAA should not be a state actor because such status would 
instigate regular, protracted, and often frivolous litigation against 
it that would thwart, if not subvert, NCAA efforts to maintain a 
level playing field among teams from competing member 
institutions and to advance core values.  The impact would be 
most severe in lawsuits brought by student-athletes, even if the 
NCAA ultimately prevailed every time, as they likely would 
compete during the course of litigation.29 
The Tarkanian holding30 has been both roundly criticized31 and 
 
27.  See, e.g., Peter C. Carstensen & Peter Olszowka, Antitrust Law, Student-Athletes, and the 
NCAA: Limiting the Scope and Conduct of Private Economic Regulation, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 545, 
549–52 (1995); Timothy Davis, African-American Student-Athletes: Marginalizing the NCAA 
Regulatory Structure?, 6 MARQ. SPORTS L. J. 199, 212–16 (1996); Alain Lapter, Bloom v. NCAA: A 
Procedural Due Process Analysis and the Need for Reform, 12 SPORTS LAW. J. 255, 265–66 (2005); 
David A. Skeel, Jr., Some Corporate and Securities Law Perspectives on Student-Athletes and the 
NCAA, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 669, 676–82 (1995). 
28.  Tarkanian, 448 U.S. at 199; see Potuto, supra note 6, at 265–72. 
29.  Student-athletes have four years of competition eligibility and a five-year window in which 
to compete.  NCAA BYLAWS § 14.2 (2009–10).  Court decisions upholding NCAA action could come 
well after a student-athlete exhausted eligibility or left school.  The NCAA has a “restitution” bylaw 
that covers circumstances in which a court enjoins the NCAA from preventing a student-athlete from 
competing until the merits of NCAA action are decided in litigation.  Id. § 19.7.  It authorizes the 
NCAA to sanction a university whose student-athlete competed if the injunction is stayed or reversed 
or if final court determination upholds the NCAA action. 
30.  Notwithstanding Tarkanian, the NCAA might be treated as a state actor through specific 
and substantial joint action with a state member institution.  See generally Cohane v. NCAA, No. 04-
CV-181S, 2005 WL 2373474 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005). 
31.  The criticism focuses on the Tarkanian decision and the general notion that the NCAA is 
exempt from due process constraints.  See generally, e.g., C. Peter Goplerud III, NCAA Enforcement 
Process: A Call for Procedural Fairness, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 543 (1991); Skeel, supra note 27; 
Sherry Young, The NCAA Enforcement Program and Due Process: The Case for Internal Reform, 43 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 747 (1992); James Potter, Comment, The NCAA as State Actor: Tarkanian, 
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defended.32  Similarly criticized and defended is the constitutional rightness or 
practical efficacy of the Supreme Court ever treating private actors as state 
actors33 and whether its articulated tests for doing so are sufficiently clear and 
delineated to produce principled decisions that preserve the constitutional 
distinction between public and private.34 
The purpose of this Article is to discuss what would happen to the 
NCAA’s regulatory authority over intercollegiate athletics were the Supreme 
Court to deem the NCAA a state actor, not to assess how the Court might get 
there or whether it would or should get there at all.35  Each side of the debate 
assumes that NCAA state actor status necessarily would trigger greater 
judicial and legislative oversight of NCAA processes; substantially more 
opportunities for non-members to prevail against alleged NCAA over-
reaching; and fundamental, perhaps widespread, change to the way the NCAA 
operates.  I disagree. 
II.  THE MORE THINGS CHANGE, THE MORE THEY STAY THE SAME 
A change in NCAA status from private to state actor means entering 
unknown territory with no precedent directly on point.  The predictable result 
is a period of flux and a flurry of lawsuits on grounds both tried and new.  And 
once the dust settles?  NCAA state actor status will force the NCAA to 
eliminate or revamp bylaws and policies affording preferential treatment to 
 
Brentwood, and Due Process, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1269 (2007); Ronald J. Thompson, Comment, Due 
Process and the National Collegiate Athletic Association: Are There Any Constitutional Standards?, 
41 UCLA L. REV. 1651 (1994). 
32.  The defense focuses on the Tarkanian decision and the general notion that NCAA 
processes are fair.  See generally, e.g., John Kitchin, The NCAA and Due Process, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 71 (1996); Mike Rogers & Rory Ryan, Navigating the Bylaw Maze in NCAA Major-
Infractions Cases, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 749 (2007); Robin J. Green, Note, Does the NCAA Play 
Fair? A Due Process Analysis of NCAA Enforcement Regulations, 42 DUKE L.J. 99 (1992). 
33.  On this subject there is extensive commentary by legal theorists and constitutional scholars. 
One issue is the degree to which courts should be faithful to constitutional text, including the level of 
generality one employs in deciding the scope and meaning of text.  See generally, e.g., Sanford 
Levinson, On Interpretation: The Adultery Clause of the Ten Commandments, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 719 
(1985); Michael Stokes Paulsen, How to Interpret the Constitution (and How Not To), 115 YALE L.J. 
2037 (2006); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 
885 (1985); Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: Intermediate Scrutiny as Judicial 
Minimalism, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 298 (1998). 
34.  See generally, e.g., Vikram David Amar, The NCAA as Regulator, Litigant, and State 
Actor, 52 B.C. L. REV. 415 (2011). 
35.  Outside the scope of this article, therefore, is how state actor status might affect the NCAA 
as employer.  The NCAA already is subject to Title VII, which governs workplace discrimination of 
employers who have at least fifteen employees.  Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–
2000e-17 (2006). 
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women and racial and ethnic minorities,36 a result unanticipated by both 
NCAA critics and supporters.  Otherwise, NCAA state actor status likely will 
have little impact on its regulation of intercollegiate athletics, including for 
those claimants and in those areas where NCAA critics most advocate for 
change. 
To believe that the NCAA would change in fundamental ways directly 
attendant on state actor status is, first and foremost, to ignore the imperatives 
that drive it and any association.  A private actor NCAA cannot act in ways 
that pose credible litigation risk to its state actor member institutions simply 
because it is immunized from liability.  State actor status is irrelevant in this 
calculus.  Once an NCAA bylaw or policy is identified as constitutionally 
suspect if enforced by a state university member, even a private actor NCAA 
necessarily will conform.37 
The current exclusive domain of Supreme Court constitutional state actor 
cases is due process, equal protection, and the First Amendment, yet another 
reason that NCAA state actor status will reap no fundamental change in 
NCAA operations.  Few, if any, NCAA bylaws and policies would fail to meet 
the requisites of these constitutional protections, except preferential treatment.  
As to committee processes, those with impact on non-members either already 
meet or exceed minimum due process requirements or could get there with a 
little tweaking.38  This in part may explain why state universities have 
experienced neither a spate of constitutional claims brought against them for 
enforcing NCAA rules nor a string of litigation defeats in lawsuits that have 
been brought.39 
The Supreme Court’s treatment of private actors as state actors for some 
constitutional rights, moreover, by no means leads inexorably to its treatment 
of private actors as state actors for all other constitutional rights.  To conclude 
otherwise is to succumb to the fallacy of the misplaced, or transplanted 
category,40 by which a classification created for one purpose and in one 
 
36.  See infra notes 133–49 and accompanying text. 
37.  See infra note 225 and accompanying text. 
38.  See infra notes 67–123 and accompanying text.  The “unprecedented” action by NCAA 
President Mark Emmert and the NCAA DI Board in sanctioning Penn State in the aftermath of the 
Jerry Sandusky child abuse scandal might have raised due process concerns were the NCAA a state 
actor except for two things: (1) the Report on which the NCAA decision was based was 
commissioned by Penn State and its findings were accepted by Penn State, and (2) Penn State agreed 
to the NCAA decision and sanctions.  See Penn State Press Conference Remarks, NCAA, 
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/resources/latest+news/2012/july/21207236 (last 
visited Oct. 29, 2012). 
39.  Cf. Brentwood I, 531 U.S. 288, 304 (2001) (noting that state-wide high school athletics 
associations deemed state actors experienced no “wave of litigation”). 
40.  See, e.g., Civil Aeronautics Bd. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 367 U.S. 316, 327 (1961). 
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context is thought to be equally applicable to all purposes and contexts.  The 
fallacy has “‘the tenacity of original sin and must constantly be guarded 
against.’”41  Moreover, even were the Supreme Court to extend state actor 
status to all incorporated Bill of Rights protections, the NCAA still would be 
relatively unaffected.  It need fear no lawsuit for infringing rights of criminal 
defendants under the Sixth Amendment, to pick one example.42  The most 
likely additional claims to which it might be held to answer ring in privacy 
under the Fourth Amendment, particularly drug testing of student-athletes.  
Yet here too, NCAA practices likely meet constitutional requirements. 
States qua states have sovereign immunity as insulation from state 
statutory and common law claims and a state action exemption from federal 
antitrust laws.43  Although unlikely that a state actor NCAA will be covered 
by sovereign immunity or exempted from antitrust liability, there is irony here.  
Should an NCAA state actor be so treated, it will end by having more, not less, 
legal protection than as a private actor NCAA.44  This is not the consequence 
NCAA critics seek.  And it is not the consequence NCAA supporters fear. 
Now, a caveat.  The “law” of unforeseen circumstances (Casey Stengel 
redux?) dictates caution when predicting the future based on past experience 
coming from different legal understandings.  The most likely “blip” in 
predicting continuance of the status quo comes from the possibility that 
litigants might sue the NCAA for perceived violations when they currently 
refrain from suing a particular state university or a coterie of them for the 
same violations.45 
The NCAA is a visible and ready target, with neither the fan base nor the 
benefit of institutional loyalty to deter putative litigants.  It is the “big dog” in 
town and the “outsider” in litigation.  Litigants may expect fact finders to be 
skeptical of NCAA contentions and inclined to make large damage awards 
against it.  In turn, they may expect to extract favorable settlement terms.  
Finally, potential economies of scale, the greater feasibility of constructing a 
plaintiff class, and a nationwide choice of courts in which to sue may release 
litigants from the practical constraints that currently may deter them from 
 
41.  Moffatt Hancock, Fallacy of the Transplanted Category, 37 CANADIAN B. REV. 535, 575 
(1959) (quoting Walter Wheeler Cook, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Conflict of Laws, 42 
YALE L.J. 333, 337 (1933)).  See generally Walter Wheeler Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the 
Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 457 (1924). 
42.  There also are no cognizable claims under the Second, Third, Fifth, and Seventh to Tenth 
Amendments. 
43.  Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (2006). 
44.  See infra notes 238–47 and accompanying text. 
45.  The other “blip” is what Congress might do.  See infra notes 226–37 and accompanying 
text. 
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bringing and maintaining lawsuits. 
III.  THE NCAA: A SHORT PRIMER 
The sine qua non of membership in an association is that each member 
must follow the bylaws and policies collectively adopted.  An association may 
enforce its bylaws and policies only on members.  In turn, only members may 
change an association’s bylaws and policies or challenge their interpretation or 
implementation. 
Things are a little tricky for associations such as the NCAA whose 
members are artificial entities.  Although colleges and universities formally 
are accountable when NCAA bylaw violations are alleged, their violations 
necessarily are committed by individuals: coach, student-athlete, etc.  
Although the NCAA formally addresses action to colleges and universities, 
consequences fall on individuals through an institution’s compliance with 
NCAA directives. 
IV.  DUE PROCESS 
Procedural due process means that individuals with constitutionally 
cognizable liberty or property interests46 that may be abridged by official 
action must have notice of that action and a reasonable opportunity to show an 
unbiased fact finder that the action should not be enforced against them.47  The 
constitutional adequacy of procedure varies by context according to how high 
the value placed on the particular substantive interest to be abridged is.48  
Because error is least tolerated in criminal trials—”it is better that ten guilty 
persons escape, than that one innocent suffer”—49criminal defendants get the 
most procedural protection.50  By contrast, prisoners in disciplinary hearings 
receive minimal protection and may even have their cases heard by fact 
finders employed by the prison.51  For student misconduct52 and student 
 
46.  See generally, e.g., Bd. of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978). 
47.  E.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580–84 (1975). 
48.  See, e.g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982); Mathews v. Eldridge, 
424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976). 
49.  4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *352.  For a general discussion of the degree to 
which we prefer false positives to false negatives, see generally Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 
U. PA. L. REV. 173 (1997). 
50.  Protections include the rights to assistance of counsel, to present evidence and to confront 
evidence presented against them, to a jury of peers as fact finder, and the highest possible burden of 
proof—beyond a reasonable doubt. 
51.  Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 570–71 (1974). 
52.  Goss, 419 U.S. at 580–84.  The reported cases, moreover, involve K–12 students, those 
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failure to meet academic standards,53 a formal hearing is not required.  Instead, 
“an informal give-and-take” suffices,54 where students have an opportunity to 
tell their story.55 
A.  Due Process Claimants and Claims: Wherefore Art They? 
For a lawsuit to be successful there must be a meritorious claim and also a 
proper party plaintiff to raise it.56  Neither is likely against a state actor 
NCAA. 
Institutions are unlikely to succeed in actions against the NCAA because 
they participated in creating the NCAA bylaws and policies they seek to 
challenge.  Student-athlete challenges center on denials of, or limits on, their 
eligibility to compete in varsity athletics.  For procedural due process, these 
claims are non-starters as courts consistently have held that student-athletes 
have no constitutional right to compete and, thus, no cognizable reliance 
interest to which procedural due process protections may attach.57  Coaches 
have a reliance property interest only to the extent that their contracts of 
employment provide it;58 in that case, they also have a contract claim that 
likely affords protection at least equivalent to that provided by procedural due 
process.59 
Other claims that might rise to the level of a cognizable property or liberty 
 
with a right to a public education. 
53.  See id.; cases cited supra notes 46 and 48; infra notes 117–18, 181. 
54.  Goss, 419 U.S. at 584. 
55.  See cases cited infra note 181. 
56.  See infra notes 133–213 and accompanying text for a discussion of the likely absence of 
merit to substantive challenges against the NCAA. 
57.  E.g., Graham v. NCAA, 804 F.2d 953, 959 n.2 (6th Cir. 1986); Hebert v. Ventetuolo, 638 
F.2d 5, 6 (1st Cir. 1981); Colo. Seminary v. NCAA, 570 F.2d 320, 321 (10th Cir. 1978); Parish v. 
NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028, 1033–34 (5th Cir. 1975), abrogated by NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 
(1988); Bloom v. NCAA, 93 P.3d 621, 624 (Colo. App. 2004); Hart v. NCAA 550 S.E.2d 79, 85–86 
(W. Va. 2001).  Like student-athletes and NCAA competition, amateur athletes have no constitutional 
right to compete in the Olympics.  DeFrantz v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 492 F. Supp. 1181, 1194–95 
(D.D.C. 1980). 
58.  See, e.g., Price v. Univ. of Ala., 318 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1090–94 (N.D. Ala. 2003); Kish v. 
Iowa Cent. Cmty. Coll., 142 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1096–99 (N.D. Iowa 2001).  Compare Bd. of Regents 
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578 (1972), with Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601–02 (1972).  There is 
no fundamental right to practice a profession.  E.g., Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1031 n.5 
(9th Cir. 1999); Amunrud v. Bd. of Appeals, 143 P.3d 571, 577 (Wash. 2006). 
59.  See Potuto, supra note 6, at 318–321.  At-will public employees may have a reliance 
property interest created by state law; if so, the due process clause dictates the procedure to be 
applied.  Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S. Ct. 859, 861–62 (2011).  Given the regularity with which 
coaches are fired or move to other positions notwithstanding contract language, there is little 
likelihood that due process will offer substantial protection additional to contract language. 
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interest—injury to reputation, for example—60ring in tort or other common 
law causes of action.  Those claiming injury need neither depend on NCAA 
status as a state actor to bring a claim nor focus on any alleged failure of 
procedural protection to reach the substantive injury caused.61 
B.  Notice 
Due process notice assures that individuals are bound by a rule only if 
they know or have reason to know about it and its language is sufficiently 
clear to signal its scope and import.62  There are many “pressure points” at 
which potential NCAA bylaws are evaluated before adoption.63  There also is 
a comprehensive system for bylaw interpretation after adoption.64 Institutional 
compliance staff provides regular NCAA rules education to staff and student-
athletes and fields questions on bylaw scope and import.  Student-athletes and 
staff agree in writing to comply with NCAA bylaws.65  A full recitation of the 
NCAA bylaw adoption and interpretation processes underscores how slim the 
chance that member institutions, or coaches and student-athletes, credibly can 
claim that they neither knew, nor should be held to know, of the existence of a 
bylaw or its application.66  This is assuredly so with regard to those bylaws 
 
60.  See generally, e.g., Perry, 408 U.S. 593. 
61.  Also not dependent on NCAA state actor status is a claim that through bylaws, policies, 
staff, or committee action, the NCAA interfered with contract rights.   
62.  See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267–68 (1970). 
63.  Proposed bylaws, with rationales, are compiled for each legislative cycle and distributed to 
all NCAA members.  See generally NCAA, LEGISLATION: NCAA DIVISION I PUBLICATION OF 
PROPOSED LEGISLATION FOR THE 2011–12 LEGISLATIVE CYCLE (2011).  Proposed bylaws are vetted 
by NCAA legal counsel.  NCAA committees and cabinets weigh in with comments and positions.  
Conference offices provide education.  “Ancillary” associations such as those of coaches and faculty 
athletics provide perspectives.  Student-athletes have a formal role.  See, e.g., Michelle Brutlag 
Hosick, SAAC Chair Emphasizes Group’s Role as Change Agent, NCAA (Nov. 8, 2011), 
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Resources/Latest+News/2011/November/SAA
C+chair+emphasizes+groups+role+as+change+agent.  Each NCAA institution has a student-athlete 
advisory committee (SAAC).  Each conference has a SAAC comprised of members from campus 
SAACs.  The national SAAC is comprised of representative from each conference SAAC. 
64.  NCAA BYLAWS § 21.7.7.2 (2009–10).  The process includes informal consultation with the 
NCAA and Conference staff as well as official interpretations posted on the NCAA website.  See id. 
§ 21.7.7.2.2(b).  NCAA staff conducts regional seminars regarding NCAA bylaws and processes; one 
focus is on bylaws newly adopted.  They also periodically publish “hot topic” alerts.  The full text of 
reports of the COI and Infractions Appeals Committee are available online.  Legislative Services 
Database–LSDBi, NCAA, https://web1.ncaa.org/LSDBi/exec/miSearch (last visited Oct. 30, 2012). 
65.  NCAA BYLAWS §§ 3.2.4.6, 11.2.1, 14.1.3.1, 30.12, 30.3.1, 30.3.3.  To recruit off campus, 
moreover, coaches annually must take and pass an NCAA coaches exam.  Id. § 11.5. 
66.  Id. §§ 22.2.1.2(c), 30.3.1.  Conference compliance staff also provide information and 
respond to questions regarding bylaw scope and import.  The result is that a failure of notice claim 
should fail no matter the committee or its processes. 
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whose breach is likely to trigger significant adverse consequences. 
C.  NCAA Bylaw Adoption 
Procedural due process in rule making means that the rule-making body 
had authority to adopt the rule67 and followed established procedures.68  
Because NCAA member institutions adopt the bylaws and policies to which 
they are bound,69 NCAA legislation almost by definition is within its 
substantive authority.  Not only is it only theoretically possible for an NCAA 
bylaw to be adopted outside established NCAA channels,70 but the NCAA can 
respond to legitimize any process defalcation by revising its procedures and 
then re-adopting a bylaw.71 
D.  NCAA Committees 
NCAA committee members are faculty and administrators at member 
institutions and conferences.72  The DI Committee on Infractions (COI) and 
the Student-Athlete Reinstatement Committee (SARC) administer bylaw 
violations.73
  
These two are the most likely to generate due process challenges 
 
67.  See generally, e.g., In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litig., 653 F.2d 514 (D.C. 
Cir. 1981). 
68.  See generally, e.g., Reuters Ltd. v. FCC, 781 F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir. 1986).  The NCAA 
legislative process includes deadlines for submitting proposals, required rationales for proposals, 
publication of proposals to all member institutions, and review of positions taken on legislation by 
coaches associations, faculty, and student-athletes through the national SAAC and Conference 
SAACs.  Proposals frequently are drafted by NCAA cabinets whose members are staff at member 
institutions or conferences.  Other proposals are vetted by committees with authority over the 
substance of a proposal.  In NCAA DI, proposals are adopted by majority vote of the Legislative 
Council and affirmed by majority vote of the Board of Directors. 
69.  The NCAA bylaw adoption process is legislative in name and nature.  Member institutions 
and conferences propose, vet, and adopt bylaws.  They also establish the procedures by which bylaws 
are proposed, vetted, and adopted.  See NCAA BYLAWS § 5 (Legislative Authority and Process).  
Members of a legislature have no greater rights than the public.  See generally Raines v. Byrd, 521 
U.S. 811 (1997); David J. Weiner, Note, The New Law of Legislative Standing, 54 STAN. L. REV. 205 
(2001).  Should member institutions object to a particular substantive bylaw or to committee 
processes that interpret and enforce it, they can attempt to forge a majority to change substance or 
process. 
70.  The claim that a policy was adopted outside established NCAA channels was made by the 
University of North Dakota in a challenge to the NCAA’s mascot policy.  See North Dakota Board 
Votes to Retire Symbols, NCAA (May 15, 2009), http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/NCAANewsArchive/2009/ 
Division+I/north%2Bdakota%2Bboard%2Bvotes%2Bto%2Bretire%2Bsymbols_05_15_09_ncaa_ne
ws.html. 
71.  This is what happened in the North Dakota mascot case.  Id. 
72.  See NCAA BYLAWS § 21.7.1.  Committee members are appointed through formal NCAA 
processes.  Id. § 21.7.3. 
73.  Member institutions must report suspected violations to NCAA staff.  Id. § 32.1.4.  The 
POTUTO REVISED 12-11 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/2012  1:45 PM 
14 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 23:1 
for a state actor NCAA should a proper due process claimant present herself.74 
1.  The COI 
The COI hears and decides cases in which institutions are alleged to have 
committed major violations of NCAA bylaws through the actions of coaches, 
student-athletes, and others for whose conduct institutions are responsible.  
Alone among NCAA committees, the COI hears adversarial presentations and 
acts as a finder of facts.  Its committee processes are the focus of commentator 
agitation for NCAA state actor status and led to Jerry Tarkanian’s lawsuit 
against the NCAA.75 
Tarkanian was the head men’s basketball coach at the University of 
Nevada-Las Vegas (UNLV).76  He was suspended by UNLV after an 
infractions hearing at which it was found to have committed violations 
because he did.77  Under COI processes then in place, only a member 
institution could respond to NCAA allegations of violations; a coach neither 
could provide his own written statement directly to the COI nor be present at 
the hearing, even if he claimed that the institution misstated his case or pointed 
its finger at him to escape additional penalties levied against it.78  The pre-
Tarkanian hearing process is consistent with how private associations conduct 
business; only members participate.  The pre-Tarkanian hearing process also 
is consistent with procedure at arbitration hearings that excludes those who are 
not formal parties even if a decision directly will affect them.79 
Although the Tarkanian Court held that a private actor NCAA is not 
constitutionally compelled to afford minimal procedural due process 
 
cooperative principle also requires that institutions abide by NCAA bylaws, cooperate in NCAA 
investigations, and enforce decisions regarding remedial action and penalties should violations have 
been committed.  Id. 
74.  Denials of waiver requests from the operation of NCAA bylaws, see infra notes 109–11, 
decisions of the Student-Athlete Drug Testing Appeals Committee, see infra notes 202–213 and 
accompanying text, and decisions of the NCAA Eligibility Center also may give rise to legal 
challenges.  The Eligibility Center decides whether prospective student-athletes meet NCAA 
academic eligibility and amateur requirements.  NCAA BYLAWS § 12.1.1.1. 
75.  See NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 183–85 (1988). 
76.  Id. at 180. 
77.  Id. at 181. 
78.  A coach’s violations also are those of the institution.  If an institution were to decide its 
coach committed no violations, then it had every interest to present that position effectively.  If it 
decided a coach committed violations, an institution also was reporting itself. 
79.  See, e.g., Lindland v. U.S. Wrestling Ass’n, 230 F.3d 1036, 1039 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The 
notion . . . that an arbitration must include all persons who could be affected by the outcome is novel 
and would work a revolution in arbitral proceedings.”); Rogers & Ryan, supra note 32, at 789–90. 
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protections at COI hearings; nonetheless, current enforcement80 and 
infractions processes nonetheless provide them81 not only to member 
institutions, but also to coaches and institutional staff members.82 Among 
other things, the opportunity to be heard afforded involved individuals such as 
Tarkanian83 includes: (i) a neutral and independent COI; (ii) a full opportunity 
 
80.  The enforcement staff conducts investigations of potential NCAA violations and is the 
moving party in framing a case for presentation to the COI.  See generally NCAA BYLAWS §§ 19, 32.  
Among the procedural protections provided during investigations to involved individuals are: (i) 
timely and periodic notice of the progress of an investigation, with a list of particulars; id. § 32.5; (ii) 
access to all enforcement staff information relevant to an alleged violation; id. §§ 32.6.4, 32.3.9, 
32.3.10.2; (iii) assistance of counsel at enforcement staff interviews; id. § 32.3.6; (iv) an enforcement 
staff case summary that sets forth allegations, together with the prime facts and circumstances relied 
on to substantiate them; id. § 32.6.7; (vi) a statute of limitations for bringing allegations; id. § 32.6.3; 
and (vii) enforcement staff notice to the COI of exculpatory as well as inculpatory information; id. 
§ 32.8.4.  
81.  In fact, some courts and commentators thought pre-Tarkanian COI procedures met due 
process.  See, e.g., Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213, 222 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Kitchin, supra note 
32, at 75.  At least two courts pointed to law professor COI members as showing that due process was 
afforded.  NCAA v. Gillard, 352 So. 2d 1072, 1082 (Miss. 1977) (professors “noted for advocating 
the protection of constitutional rights”); Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. NCAA, 560 F.2d 352, 366 (8th 
Cir. 1977) (noting the “distinguished panel of jurisprudential scholars . . . beyond reproach as an 
impartial decision makers [sic]”).  
82.  See generally Green, supra note 32.  These protections do not extend to boosters, those who 
are known or should be known to an institution as promoting or attempting to assist an athletics 
program.  See NCAA BYLAWS § 13.02.13.  Booster misconduct is a source of institutional violations 
and penalties.  See generally, e.g., NCAA, SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY INFRACTIONS 
REPORT (1987); NCAA, UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA, TUSCALOOSA PUBLIC INFRACTIONS REPORT, 
NO. 193 (2002) [hereinafter ALABAMA INFRACTIONS REPORT]; NCAA, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 
PUBLIC INFRACTIONS REPORT, NO. M191 (2003); DAVID WHITFORD, A PAYROLL TO MEET: A 
STORY OF GREED, CORRUPTION, AND FOOTBALL AT SMU (1989).  COI findings of booster 
misconduct may result in a direction to an institution to disassociate a booster from its athletics 
program.  NCAA BYLAWS § 19.5.2.6.  Boosters receive rules education on bylaws that affect them 
through in-person instructional sessions, game-day programs, and periodic mailings.   Because their 
relationship with a program is more attenuated than that of a coach or student-athlete, the only 
sanction that directly affects them is their disassociation from an athletic program on a COI finding 
that they were involved in violations.  Booster exclusion is grounded in the fact that they have not 
even a tenuous due process liberty or property interest arising out of their making contributions, 
getting “perks,” or having special access or insider institutional status.  In addition, booster 
participation at COI hearings adversely may impact the truth-finding function.  In the absence of 
subpoena power, not all boosters with information will appear, with the result that the COI will have 
an uneven body of information on which to decide and an uneven opportunity to evaluate demeanor 
and pursue information through questions.  Boosters may have additional information or may provide 
a fuller context in which to evaluate presentations by an institution or involved individual.  If so, their 
information can be presented through the NCAA enforcement staff or an institution.  An institution 
may avoid findings of violations and imposition of penalties if a booster is not culpable and also 
avoid a major financial hit through booster disassociation.  It therefore has every reason to be 
vigorous in representing and defending a booster’s conduct when in good faith it believes the booster 
is not culpable. 
83.  And, of course, the member institution charged with violations. 
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to present their case,84 including sufficient time to respond to allegations in 
writing85 and presence at a COI hearing with counsel;86 (iii) COI reliance on 
information only when that information has been provided to involved 
individuals and the source identified to them;87 (iv) COI fact finding based 
exclusively on the record before it;88 (v) COI findings of violations only when 
supported by information that is “credible, persuasive and of a kind on which 
reasonably prudent persons rely in the conduct of serious affairs”;89 (vi) a 
written COI report that sets forth the grounds for findings and penalties;90 and 
(vii) the right to appeal adverse findings to a neutral and independent 
infractions appeals committee.91 
2.  The SARC 
Student-athlete violations range from academic fraud,92 agent 
representation,93 receipt of large amounts of money,94 and gambling95 to 
unintentional violations such as receipt of recommended books on a book 
scholarship (when only required books may be provided),96 retention of used 
 
84.  NCAA BYLAWS § 32.8.7.3. 
85.  Id. §§ 32.6.5, 32.6.6.1, 32.6.8, 32.8.7.4. 
86.  Id. § 32.8.6.  There also is the opportunity to have questions answered.  Id. § 32.8.7.6. 
87.  Id. § 32.8.7.4.1.  These protections are not structural but personal and waivable.  ALABAMA 
INFRACTIONS REPORT, supra note 82, aff’d on all findings, NCAA, UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA, 
TUSCALOOSA PUBLIC INFRACTIONS APPEALS COMMITTEE REPORT, NO. 193 (2002).  A source is not 
confidential if she is identified to an institution or involved individual against whom her information 
would be used even though she is not identified to the COI.  NCAA BYLAWS § 32.8.7.4.1 
88.  In exercising its adjudicative function, the COI has not always found violations alleged by 
the enforcement staff and also has reduced violations from major, as charged, to secondary.  Potuto, 
supra note 6, at 296. 
89.  NCAA BYLAWS § 32.8.8.2.  In making findings, the COI considers the credibility of 
individuals providing information, including whether they have reason to lie, the internal consistency 
of their information, how the information matches up with other information in the record, and any 
corroborative information.  Another component of the due process provided at COI hearings relates to 
the procedural requirements to which the NCAA enforcement staff must comply in presenting 
information at the hearing.  See id. § 19.4.  The COI hears claims of procedural issues arising out of 
the investigative process.  See generally, e.g., NCAA, WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY PUBLIC 
INFRACTIONS REPORT, NO. 265 (2007). 
90.  NCAA BYLAWS § 32.9.1. 
91.  Id. §§ 32.11, 19.2.1.1; see generally Glenn Wong, et al., The NCAA’s Infractions Appeals 
Committee: Recent Case History, Analysis and the Beginning of a New Chapter, 9 VA. SPORTS & 
ENT. L.J. 47 (2009). 
92.  NCAA BYLAWS § 10.1(b). 
93.  Id. § 12.3.  
94.  See id. § 16.02.3. 
95.  Id. § 10.3. 
96.  Id. §. 15.2.3 NCAA, NCAA DIVISION I STUDENT-ATHLETE REINSTATEMENT GUIDELINES 
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athletic equipment,97 or acceptance of a sandwich purchased by a booster.98  
The SARC deals with reinstatement of competition eligibility because 
commission of violations automatically renders a student-athlete ineligible.  
Consequences for student-athlete violations range from permanent 
ineligibility99 to unconditional reinstatement.100 
SARC proceedings are informal.101  The SARC makes no independent 
decision whether or how a violation was committed, but instead relies on the 
position taken by the student-athlete’s institution.102  The SARC decides the 
degree of student-athlete culpability based on the facts presented to it as well 
as whether and under what conditions a student-athlete may be reinstated to 
competition eligibility, including the duration of any period of competition 
ineligibility.103 
A high volume of reinstatement decisions are processed annually.104  
Cases typically are straightforward and often time-sensitive as a student-
 
22–23 (2011) [hereinafter REINSTATEMENT GUIDELINES]; Email from Jennifer Henderson, Student-
Athlete Reinstatement Staff, to author (Feb. 17, 2011) (on file with author).  For a discussion of some 
of the reinstatement guidelines, see Potuto, supra note 6, at 284 n.112. 
97.  NCAA BYLAWS § 16.11.1.6. 
98.  See id. § 16.02.3. 
99.  See REINSTATEMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 96.  Permanent ineligibility occurs only in 
about one percent of reinstatement cases.  NCAA BYLAWS § 21.7.7.3; Student-Athlete Frequently 
Asked Questions, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/myportal/ncaahome?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTE 
XT=/ncaa/ncaa/legislation+and+governance/compliance/student-athlete+reinstatement/sar+frequently 
+asked+questions&Frequently%20Asked%20Questions%20%28FAQs%29 (on file with author) 
[hereinafter Reinstatement Questions]. 
100.  Some violations are sufficiently de minimus to warrant no eligibility consequence.  For 
example, extra benefits valued at less than $100.00, REINSTATEMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 96, at 
10, and receipt of recommended texts on a book scholarship (only required texts may be provided).  
Although there may be no withholding, a student-athlete still must disgorge himself of the benefit 
before being able to compete.  Id. 
101.  Informality does not a due process violation make.  In Brentwood I, 531 U.S. 288 (2001), 
a high school sued for an alleged violation of the First Amendment.  It also claimed that its due 
process rights were violated by an appeal board’s review of notes Brentwood never saw and ex parte 
discussion with case investigators and the person who presided in prior proceedings.  The Court 
described as “questionable” the district judge’s holding that due process was violated.  Tenn. 
Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad. (Brentwood II), 551 U.S. 291, 303–04 (2007).  
The Court also said that, assuming a violation, any error was harmless.  Id. at 303. 
102.  An institution unsure whether conduct constitutes a violation may query NCAA staff.  It 
also may seek a waiver from the operation of a bylaw from the committee with authority over the 
substantive bylaw.  Potuto, supra note 6, at 272–76. 
103.  Reinstatement Questions, supra note 99, at 3.  Because student-athlete violations also are 
institutional violations, student-athlete violations may be part of a case presented to the COI with 
regard to the consequences to institutions flowing from what its student-athletes did. 
104.  In academic year 2010–11, there were approximately 1,850 reinstatement requests; ninety-
nine percent resulted in the student-athlete being reinstated (some with a condition).  Id. at 3. 
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athlete may not compete until reinstated.  SARC staff handles reinstatement 
requests in the first instance, with the opportunity to appeal to the SARC 
through telephonic hearing.105 
The SARC has guidelines governing reinstatement.106  So long as the 
SARC acted within its jurisdiction in adopting a guideline, an institution 
would have no more success challenging that guideline than it would 
challenging an NCAA bylaw.  Also going nowhere would be a challenge to a 
SARC conclusion that violations were committed, given that the reinstatement 
process adopts the institution’s conclusion and also relies on its explication as 
to how.107  The only viable challenges open to an institution, then, relate to the 
SARC’s failure to depart downward from its guidelines for reinstatement108 or 
in its decision regarding the degree of student-athlete culpability. 
Downward departures from a guideline are waivers from its operation.109  
Providing waivers from the regular operation of duly adopted rules is not 
required by due process.  Instead, waivers provide more process than is due.110  
 
105.  Id. at 1. 
106.  See generally id. at 2. 
107.  Id. at 2. 
108.  If the SARC or its staff deliberately refuses to apply an articulated guideline exception 
that squarely fits a particular case, there almost certainly would be a due process violation.  See 
Harding v. U.S. Figure Skating Ass’n, 851 F. Supp. 1476, 1479 (D. Or. 1994), vacated on other 
grounds, 879 F. Supp. 1053 (D. Or. 1995) (explaining that courts intervene in associational decisions 
only “in the most extraordinary circumstances” when an association fails to follow its own rules); 
Slaney v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 244 F.3d 580, 595–96 (7th Cir. 2001); Schulz v. U.S. Boxing 
Ass’n, 105 F.3d 127, 135–36 (3d Cir. 1997); Gahan v. U.S. Amateur Confederation of Roller Skating, 
382 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1129–30 (D. Neb. 2005); Lindemann v. Am. Horse Shows Ass’n, 624 
N.Y.S.2d 723, 730 (Sup. Ct. 1994).  An exception would be if the SARC finds changed circumstances 
and denies a guideline condition in the instant and all succeeding cases. 
109.  NCAA committees have authority to grant waivers from the operation of bylaws under 
their jurisdiction.  E.g., NCAA BYLAWS §§ 21.7.5.1.3.1, 21.7.5.1.3.2.  The Subcommittee for 
Legislative Relief of the DI Legislative Council is a “catch-all” committee to which a waiver may be 
submitted when there is no other committee with jurisdiction to act.  Id. § 5.4.1.3.  The discussion 
regarding the constitutionality of downward SARC departures is equally applicable to NCAA waiver 
decisions. 
110.  The nature of legislation and rules—indeed all of life—is that they do not operate 
perfectly to capture all situations relevant to their purpose and to exclude all that do not fit.  
Legislation and rules may be both over- and under-inclusive and not offend due process.  See 
generally Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 
341 (1949).  In situations involving the doctrine of independent and adequate state grounds, the 
Supreme Court has granted relief from the due operation of a procedural rule in rare occasions when 
the application of the rule is “unduly harsh.”  See Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 393–94 (2002); 
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 123–25 (1990).  An institution may claim that denial of a downward 
departure offends due process because the facts of its case resemble those where the SARC granted an 
outside-guideline departure.  The institution at least would need to show a track record of SARC 
departures to demonstrate that SARC's failure similarly to exercise discretion in the instant case is 
arbitrary or discriminatory. 
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For a court to overturn a denial of a downward departure, it most likely would 
need to find that the SARC denial was arbitrary or discriminatory;111 the 
likelihood of success is low. 
With regard to assessments of student-athlete culpability, SARC processes 
likely would be evaluated in light of due process requirements in student 
misconduct and academic dismissal proceedings.  For misconduct by public 
school students, even when the potential consequence is expulsion,112 the 
requisites of due process are met by an informal process whereby a student has 
a chance to tell his story.113  Although the NCAA is not an educational 
institution, it has been described as a “surrogate”114 for the educational 
institutions that are its members.  NCAA committees are peopled by some of 
the same type of campus administrators who hear student discipline cases.  
Not only may the same types of conduct be reviewed by both campus 
disciplinary committees and the SARC, particular conduct may involve review 
by both.115 
From the perspective of student-athletes, there are two significant 
differences between university processes and the SARC.  The first difference 
is the degree of deprivation suffered.  Except, possibly, for decisions declaring 
a student-athlete permanently ineligible for competition, imposing a lengthy 
 
111.  See generally Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006) (discussing scope of 
review); Bd. of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 91–92 (1978); Bloom v. NCAA, 93 P.3d 621, 623 
(Colo. App. 2004); Potuto, supra note 6, at 262–63.  A student's claim that he should be permitted to 
retake an exam, for example, did not survive a motion to dismiss.  Keen v. W. New Eng. Coll., 499 
N.E.2d 310, 311 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986).  Cf. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 236 
(1969); NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 464–65 (1958); Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 
22, 24–25 (1923). 
112.  See, e.g., Tun v. Whitticker, 398 F.3d 899, 901 (7th Cir. 2005); Boykins v. Fairfield Bd. of 
Educ., 492 F.2d 697, 700–02 (5th Cir. 1974) (illustrating hearsay testimony involving reading 
statements of teachers regarding charges); Linwood v. Bd. of Ed., 463 F.2d 763, 765 (7th Cir. 1972).  
Academic dismissals fare no better.  See generally, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); 
Mauriello v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry, 781 F.2d 46 (3d Cir. 1986); Hammond v. Auburn Univ., 669 
F. Supp. 1555 (M.D. Ala. 1987); Cuddihy v. Wayne State Univ. Bd. of Governors, 413 N.W.2d 692 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1987); Morin v. Cleveland Metro. Gen. Hosp. Sch. of Nursing, 516 N.E.2d 1257 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1986). 
113.  See generally Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Tasby v. Estes, 643 F.2d 1103 (5th 
Cir. 1981).  It need not offend due process for an administrator to initiate and investigate charges and 
also serve as hearing officer.  E.g., Dreyfus ex rel. Brewer v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 779 F.2d 260, 
261–63 (5th Cir. 1985).  Similarly, it need not offend due process for an appellate board reviewing a 
student’s suspension to hold closed-door deliberations with the principal and superintendent who 
testified against the student and to use as board advisor the attorney who presented the charges.  Lamb 
v. Panhandle Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 2, 826 F.2d 526, 529–30 (7th Cir. 1987); NCAA v. Gillard, 
352 So. 2d 1072, 1081–82 (Miss. 1977); see Kitchin, supra note 32, at 75. 
114.  Cureton v. NCAA, 37 F. Supp. 2d 687, 703 (E.D. Pa. 1999), rev’d, 198 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 
1999). 
115.  The situation more likely arises in academic misconduct cases. 
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ineligibility period, or excluding a student-athlete from a championship 
competition opportunity, the deprivation suffered will not equate to a student’s 
lengthy suspension or expulsion from school.  The second difference is that, 
contrary to their right in university processes, student-athletes have no right to 
make independent presentations to the SARC.116  This difference, however, is 
unlikely to provide student-athletes with a procedural due process claim. 
In the first place, student-athletes typically provide written explanation of 
the circumstances of a violation that is included in an institution’s submission.  
Thus, as a matter of practice, they make a presentation even though as a matter 
of right they may be excluded. 
Second, student-athlete claims for reinstatement may be said to be 
subsumed in that of the member institution or, in any event, are no greater than 
that of the institution.117  Athletics departments regularly advocate for student-
athlete interests.118  They intervene when the media criticize their student-
athletes.119  In almost every reinstatement case, their interests are co-extensive 
with their student-athlete’s.120  Both want the student-athlete to be eligible to 
compete and as soon as possible.121 It is at least doubtful, therefore, that 
student-athletes speaking independently would do better than their institutions 
speaking for them.122 
The conclusive reason why student-athletes will be unable to successfully 
challenge a state actor SARC decision is that, absent a sharp turn in course by 
 
116.  Reinstatement Questions, supra note 99, at 3. 
117.  Even were student-athletes to be treated as third-party beneficiaries to the NCAA 
association “contract” among member institutions, their claims would be no broader than those of 
their member institutions, and they would fail on the same grounds.  E.g., Bloom v. NCAA, 93 P.3d 
621, 624 (Colo. App. 2004).   
118.  See generally Josephine R. Potuto, Academic Misconduct, Athletics Academic Support 
Services, and the NCAA, 95 KY. L.J. 447 (2007). 
119.  See, e.g., Brett Baker, The Angst and Adulation of Bo Pelini, NEBRASKA 
STATEPAPER.COM (Oct. 14, 2011), http://nebraska.statepaper.com/vnews/display.v/ART/4e9811279 
cd96; Tom Friend, Reid: Gundy’s Rant “Basically Ended My Life”, ESPN (Apr. 15, 2008), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=3341578. 
120.  On occasion an institution will not have as strong an interest as its student-athlete.  There 
may be others on the team who can replace the student-athlete; or a coach may have "issues" with him 
and no longer want to have him compete; or he may be in his final season of eligibility and, given the 
time in the season in which the violation occurred, the coach may want to play younger student-
athletes.  It is possible, therefore, that an institution will not petition for reinstatement. 
121.  In addition, fans, donors, on occasion boards of regents, and others may exert external 
pressure on athletics departments to act aggressively in representing student-athlete interests before 
the SARC. 
122.  Where an institution declines to petition for reinstatement, see supra note 120, a student-
athlete might be advantaged were she to have an independent due process right to advance a claim.  
On closer look, however, this opportunity may be pyrrhic.  Eligibility does not equal playing time—
that decision is the coach’s. 
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the Supreme Court, they have no cognizable reliance interest in an opportunity 
to compete and, therefore, no due process claim to be made.123  State actor 
status by itself needs neither impel the NCAA to revise reinstatement 
processes to provide direct and independent participation by student-athletes 
nor provide them enhanced opportunity to challenge an adverse reinstatement 
decision in court. 
It is no doubt possible—I would argue preferable—for NCAA processes 
to offer student-athletes an independent role in reinstatement processes, at 
least when an institution refuses to petition for reinstatement or when student-
athletes can show significant disagreement between them and their institutions 
as to the facts or degree of culpability.124  At the very least, it would enhance 
student-athlete satisfaction with their treatment,125 as well as the perception of 
fairness of NCAA critics.  It is not my purpose, however, to describe here a 
SARC process that would include formal student-athlete presence, the possible 
practical obstacles to doing so, or the policy reasons in favor.126  I simply 
point out three things. 
First, NCAA state actor status does not equate to a constitutional mandate 
that student-athletes be formally included in the student-athlete reinstatement 
process.  Second, NCAA state actor status would not enhance the opportunity 
of student-athletes to raise a due process challenge in court to SARC processes 
from which they were excluded, or to prevail on the merits, even if they 
suffered permanent competition ineligibility and their interests and those of 
 
123.  Even absent a due process reliance interest in employment, an individual might make a 
due process challenge if his reputational interests were affected by a decision of a state actor.  
Compare Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 568–69 (1972), with Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 
593, 595 (1972).  It is unlikely, however, that a student-athlete could show injury to reputation.  
Reinstatement reports name neither student-athlete nor institution and their recitation of the 
circumstances of a decision is brief. 
124.  Giving student-athletes a formal opportunity to present a written statement would cure any 
potential due process violation that arguably might exist.  The Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur 
Sports Act governs national team amateur competition.  36 U.S.C. §§ 220501–220512 (2006).  
Athletes denied a place on an amateur team may challenge the decision before the NGB in the sport 
and also seek USOC review.  Id.  Amateur athletes may not sue the USOC or NGBs.  Id.  Instead, 
they must submit to binding arbitration.  Id.  See generally, e.g., Slaney v. Int'l Amateur Athletic 
Fed’n, 244 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 2001); Oldfield v. Athletic Cong., 779 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1985). 
125.  See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 273–74, 278 (Princeton Univ. 
Press ed. 2006); Amy Gangl, Procedural Justice Theory and Evaluations of the Lawmaking Process, 
25 POL. BEHAV. 119, 135 (2003); Tom R. Tyler, Governing Amid Diversity: The Effect of Fair 
Decisionmaking Procedures on the Legitimacy of Government, 28 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 809, 827 
(1994); Tom R. Tyler, What is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness 
of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 103, 132 (1988). 
126.  In a forthcoming article co-authored with Professor Matt Mitten, Director of the Marquette 
Sports Law Institute, we compare NCAA committee processes with those employed by the USOC 
and NGOs. 
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their institution were at odds.  For that to happen, student-athletes must have a 
cognizable due process interest in an opportunity to compete.  Third, were a 
state, or for that matter, private actor NCAA to provide student-athletes entry 
to its SARC processes, it need make no fundamental change to those processes 
for them to comport with what minimum due process requires. 
V.  EQUAL PROTECTION 
The Equal Protection Clause was included in the Fourteenth Amendment 
to provide federal protection for racial and ethnic minorities against state 
policies and practices that discriminate against them.127  Then came 
affirmative action and other policies affording preferential treatment to 
minorities and women to account for historical discrimination and other 
obstacles preventing their full societal participation.128  Finally came Supreme 
Court cases requiring that discrimination advantaging racial and ethnic 
minorities and women be treated with the same level of scrutiny129 afforded 
discrimination disadvantaging them.130  The end result is that state action 
focused on race or gender is constitutionally suspect no matter the motive or 
beneficiary. 
Diversity in higher education is so compelling a government interest that 
universities have unique latitude to use race and ethnicity as one factor in 
deciding which students to admit to their institutions.131  Universities may 
neither justify all their actions and policies on grounds of diversity, however, 
nor use quotas to achieve it.132 
 
127.  See generally Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). 
128.  See generally, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Regents of the Univ. of 
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 
U.S. 351 (1974).  See also Kimberly A. Yuracko, One for You and One for Me: Is Title IX's Sex-
Based Proportionality Requirement for College Varsity Athletic Positions Defensible?, 97 NW. U. L. 
REV. 731, 751 (2003). 
129.  Strict scrutiny is employed to review equal protection claims based on race or ethnicity.  
See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 
11 (1967).  Intermediate scrutiny requiring an “exceedingly persuasive justification” is employed to 
review gender discrimination claims.  United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996). 
130.  See generally Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. 
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 
(1995); J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469; Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
131.  Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 
(2003) (holding that courts defer to university academic decisions due to the “important purpose of 
public education and the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university 
environment . . . ”); Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (plurality opinion) (“The 
freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its student 
body.”). 
132.  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334–40. 
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To violate constitutional equal protection, there must not only be a 
discriminatory effect but a purpose to discriminate.133  The NCAA has no 
policy or bylaw that embodies purposeful adverse discrimination.  Its initial 
eligibility bylaws are those most comparable to admissions decisions, where at 
least an argument might be made that preferential treatment is constitutional.  
These, however, give no preferential treatment to racial and ethnic 
minorities.134  In its governance structure, the programs it administers, and the 
internal operation of its national office,135 by contrast, the NCAA is permeated 
with preferential treatment policies designed to expand opportunities for racial 
and ethnic minorities and women, including through the use of quotas.136  All 
these are constitutionally suspect when the actor implementing them is a state 
actor, with quotas per se unconstitutional.137  A sampling of NCAA programs 
that administer quotas is: 
 The DI Board of Directors must include at least one ethnic 
minority and at least one woman.138  The three major DI 
governance groups, the Leadership and Legislative Councils and 
the Championships/Sports Management Cabinet, in combination 
must include at least twenty percent ethnic minorities and thirty-
five percent women.139  Similarly, the combined membership of 
the five remaining DI cabinets also must include at least twenty 
percent ethnic minorities and thirty-five percent women.140 
 NCAA committees also have quotas.  For example, the COI must 
have at least two women among its ten members.141 
 
133.  Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). 
134.  A state actor also may not administer formally neutral policies in a discriminatory way.  
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886).  There is no evidence that I know of, however, 
suggesting that committee waivers of initial eligibility requirements afford preferential treatment to 
minorities. 
135.  Potentially at risk is the national office affirmative action hiring program.  NCAA 
BYLAWS § 31.8.1.1 (2009–10). 
136.  Id. §§ 4.02.5 (setting forth “Gender and Diversity Requirements”), 4.02.6.1 (setting forth 
“Selection” procedures). 
137.  Quotas are permitted only as a remedy for a specific past equal protection violation by a 
particular state actor against whom the quota will apply.  Gender discrimination is subject to 
intermediate scrutiny, a test less rigorous than strict scrutiny.  See cases cited supra note 129.  The 
result is that some gender quotas might survive when race quotas would not.  Some argue that in 
practice the test for gender and race discrimination cases is the same.  See, e.g., Candace Saari 
Kovacic-Fleischer, United States v. Virginia’s New Gender Equal Protection Analysis with 
Ramifications for Pregnancy, Parenting, and Title VII, 50 VAND. L. REV. 845, 869–70 (1997). 
138.  NCAA BYLAWS § 4.02.5. 
139.  Id. 
140.  Id. 
141.  Id. § 19.1.1. 
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 Certain student-athlete leadership and other programs are open 
only to women or ethnic minorities; other programs preserve 
designated slots for them.142 
 Certain programs for athletic administrators are open only to 
women or ethnic minorities.143 
 An obvious example of a quota involves the Senior Woman 
Administrator (SWA) position mandated at every NCAA member 
institution and conference.144  The SWA is part of conference 
governance and eligible to serve in NCAA governance.  Only a 
woman may be an SWA. 
Other committees that might be at risk are the fifteen-member Minority 
Opportunities and Interests Committee (committee may have no fewer than 
eight ethnic minority members)145 and fifteen-member Committee on 
Women’s Athletics (committee may have no fewer than four male and four 
female members).146  That these committees focus particularly on issues 
affecting minorities and women does not make them unconstitutional.  In 
addition to their membership requirements, what might call their status into 
question is that both committees have special reporting access directly to the 
DI Leadership Council and not through a particular cabinet.147 
Unless the Supreme Court greatly expands the scope and reasoning of its 
higher education decisions or reverses course on the constitutionality of 
 
142.  A sampling of programs includes the NCAA Post-Graduate Scholarship Program 
(requiring an equal number of scholarships to men’s and women’s student-athletes without regard to 
comparative qualifications); the Division III Ethnic Minority and Women’s Internship Grant Program 
(providing funds to an institution for a ten-month internship in administration and coaching); the 
NCAA Black Coaches and Administrators Achieving Coaching Excellence Program (a program that 
prepares racial and ethnic minorities to be head basketball coaches); the Division II Strategic Alliance 
Matching Grant Enhancement Program (providing three-year seed funds to institutions and 
conferences for administrative positions for minorities and women); the Women’s Leadership 
Symposium (outlining leadership instruction for women); and the Matching Grant for the 
Advancement of Ethnic Minority Women Coaches and Officials (advancing development of minority 
women coaches).  NCAA Student-Athlete Affairs Program Descriptions (Sept. 9, 2011) (on file with 
author). 
143.  For example, the NCAA Pathway Program.  For information on the program, see 
Memorandum from Curtis Hollomon, NCAA Dir. of Leadership Dev., on NCAA Pathway Program 
Registration (Sept. 4, 2012) (on file with author). 
144.  NCAA BYLAWS § 4.02.4.  The SWA is not a mandated employment position.  Rather, a 
woman must be designated as the SWA and, by virtue of her designation, she serves a governance 
role in the athletics conference of which her institution is a member and is eligible to serve on NCAA 
councils, cabinets, and committees. 
145.  Id. § 21.2.4.  The Committee also must have no fewer than four male and four female 
members.  Id. 
146.  Id. § 21.2.10. 
147.  Id. at Figure 4-1. 
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preferential treatment, a state actor NCAA would need to eliminate any quotas 
it administers and most likely eliminate, or at least restructure, other NCAA 
initiatives aimed at enhancing racial, ethnic, and gender diversity in athletics 
administration and coaching and in professional and graduate opportunities for 
student-athletes.148  NCAA member universities might choose to have the 
NCAA proceed as before with its preferential treatment bylaws and policies in 
the hope that a plaintiff with standing to challenge them will not come 
forward.  Although some suggest that universities would engage in intentional 
and knowing flouting of constitutional mandates enunciated by the Supreme 
Court,149 I am not one of them. 
VI.  THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
A.  Some General Principles 
The First Amendment covers a wealth of speech, expressive, and 
associational activities.  The Supreme Court employs different operative tests 
to a multitude of variables.  The Court looks at content150 and viewpoint 
restrictions;151 time, place, and manner restrictions; speech evaluated as 
conduct;152 and conduct evaluated as speech.153  The Court considers the type 
 
148.  The impact on diversity initiatives also may extend to federal statutory mandates to which 
the NCAA currently voluntarily subscribes.  The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits discrimination 
when there is both discriminatory impact and purpose.  See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–
40 (1976).  In programs receiving federal funds, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000d (2006) (focusing on race), and educational programs receiving federal funds, Title IX, 20 
U.S.C. § 1681 (2006) (focusing on gender), the Supreme Court has upheld congressional restrictions 
on practices that have an adverse impact independent of purpose.  NCAA member institutions, private 
and state, are subject to Titles VI and IX, but the NCAA is not.  See infra notes 218–20 and 
accompanying text.  As a private actor, the NCAA may adhere to the statutory requirements and does 
so, for example, in its provision of equal championship opportunities for men and women.  As a state 
actor not subject to Titles VI and IX, the NCAA may face constitutional obstacles to complying with 
statutory strictures that go beyond the Fourteenth Amendment.  Cf. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson 
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 518 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“The 
process by which a law that is an equal protection violation when enacted by a State becomes 
transformed to an equal protection guarantee when enacted by Congress poses a difficult proposition 
for me . . . .”). 
149.  See, e.g., Tamar Lewin, Michigan Rejects Affirmative Action, and Backers Sue, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2006, at 16. 
150.  See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811 (2000). 
151.  See Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors, 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995); Texas v. Johnson, 491 
U.S. 397, 404 (1989). 
152.  See Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 319–21 (1951) (looking at disorderly conduct as 
speech). 
153.  See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566–69 (1991); Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404.  
Speech, or expressive activity, also may be characterized as a property right under copyright law. 
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of speech—political speech,154 obscenity,155 commercial speech,156 fighting 
words, hate speech,157 libelous speech,158 child pornography—159and speech 
that discloses private information.160 
The situs of speech matters.  The First Amendment permits the least 
latitude for government regulation in traditional public fora for speech 
purposes161 and a great deal of latitude to regulate speech at schools,162 
prisons,163 and military bases, particularly speech by schoolchildren and 
armed forces personnel.164  There are different rules when the government acts 
as a sovereign to regulate citizen speech,165 when speech is considered that of 
the government itself,166 and when the government acts as an employer to 
 
154.  Political speech receives the highest protection under the First Amendment.  See 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1969). 
155.  Obscenity is unprotected by the First Amendment.  Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 
(1973). 
156.  See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561–62 
(1980); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761–62 
(1976).  Government may regulate advertising no further than to require that they be truthful and 
neither deceptive nor misleading.  See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367 (2002); 
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554 (2001). 
157.  Compare R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 387 (1992), with Wisconsin v. 
Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487 (1993), and Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 
(1942).  There also is sexual harassment speech under Title VII.  See generally, e.g., Carr v. Allison 
Gas Turbine Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 1007 (7th Cir. 1994); Kingsley R. Browne, Zero 
Tolerance for the First Amendment: Title VII’s Regulation of Employee Speech, 27 OHIO N. U.L. 
REV. 563 (2001). 
158.  See generally Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); Gertz v. Robert Welch, 
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); N.Y. Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
159.  See generally New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
160.  See generally, e.g., United States v. Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Bates v. City of Little 
Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).  Speech invading 
privacy interests includes invasion of privacy torts.  Compare Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 532–
33 (1989), and Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492–96 (1975), with Sidis v. F-R Publ’g 
Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809–10 (2d Cir. 1940).  See generally Edward J. Bloustein, The First 
Amendment and Privacy: The Supreme Court Justice and the Philosopher, 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 41 
(1974). 
161.  See generally Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985).   
162.  See generally Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. 
No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 
(1969). 
163.  E.g., Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413–419 (1989); Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ 
Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129–133 (1977). 
164.  See generally Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974). 
165.  E.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715–17 (1977). 
166.  E.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192–200 (1991). 
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regulate speech of its employees.167 
The most likely areas in which NCAA regulatory bylaws and policies may 
have First Amendment implications involve unsportsmanlike conduct 
restrictions on coaches, athletics administrators, and student-athletes; 
recruiting restrictions of speech activities; and crowd control at athletics 
events.168 
B.  Coach Discipline 
Head coaches and senior athletics administrators are part of the public face 
of a university.  They are expected to be positive role models for student-
athletes as well as for youth generally.169  What head coaches say is widely 
quoted and extensively scrutinized in the traditional media; on a multitude of 
talk broadcast, cablecast, and internet shows; and by bloggers, tweeters, and 
others.  Their conduct bears on public perceptions of a university and, 
although less directly, on the NCAA as an association of all universities. 
Although the government qua government is subject to tight constitutional 
tests when it acts to prohibit or regulate citizen speech, the government as 
employer may sanction its employees for what they say in the course of their 
employment responsibilities,170 even when they speak on matters of public 
concern.171  It is theoretically possible that a coach or athletics administrator 
might write an opinion piece in which she employs, for example, sexist 
stereotypes to make a point.  Should she write as a concerned citizen and not 
pursuant to her official responsibilities, then traditional First Amendment 
 
167.  E.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417–20 (2006); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. 
Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 678–81 (1996); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983); U.S. Civil 
Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 554–56 (1973); Pickering v. Bd. of 
Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).   
168.  State institutions sometimes encounter issues involving the religious clauses of the First 
Amendment.  NCAA policies and practices do not mirror areas in which state actors have 
encountered difficulties (e.g., Christmas religious scenes, official prayer at championships, etc.).  If 
the NCAA is subject to litigation risk, therefore, it should be less than that faced by state institutions. 
169.  NCAA BYLAWS §§ 10.01.1, 11.1.2.1, 19.01.2 (2009–10). 
170.  E.g., Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–48; Pickering, 381 U.S. at 568.  One open, and predicate, 
question―recall the fallacy of the misplaced category―is whether the Court that makes the NCAA a 
state actor for First Amendment purposes also would treat it as one when it acts as an employer to 
restrict speech. 
171.  See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418.  No doubt watching athletics competition is a central 
preoccupation of many citizens, and it might be argued, therefore, that coaches’ public criticism of 
referees is a matter of public concern in that it provides information on whether games are 
administered by competent officials in an unbiased way.  Whatever the merits of such a claim, 
however, there is no doubt that the coach’s criticism is in his role as coach, not as public-spirited 
citizen. 
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protections would apply.172  But this is far from the typical context in which 
coaches and administrators speak. 
NCAA bylaws penalize coaches and athletic administrators for using 
obscene or racist language and other offensive speech antithetical to civil 
discourse in a university community and to the ideals of intercollegiate 
athletics.173  NCAA bylaws also penalize coaches and athletic administrators 
for publicly criticizing game officials or competitors.174  The rationale for 
these latter rules extends beyond the role model responsibility of a coach or 
administrator to the need to maintain confidence in the integrity of the game 
and in the competence and neutrality of referees, umpires, and other game 
officials.  Prohibiting public criticism also relates to attracting quality 
individuals to take these jobs and the cost of getting them. 
In Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Academy 
(Brentwood II), the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a high 
school association’s rule prohibiting “undue influence” in recruiting.175  The 
rule was violated when the Brentwood Academy head football coach wrote 
personally to prospective student-athletes preliminarily committed to attend 
his school.  The Court applied the public employee First Amendment test to 
the association, holding that its recruiting rule was constitutional because it 
was “necessary to manag[e] an efficient and effective . . . athletic league.”176 
The Brentwood II decision upholds the right of the NCAA to adopt 
speech-related rules as enforced against member institutions, clearly.  It likely 
makes no difference, moreover, that the party before the Court was 
Brentwood, not the coach whose speech violated the rule.  Admittedly, one 
aspect of the Court’s holding emphasized facts not applicable to a coach―that 
Brentwood’s right was cabined by its voluntary decision to join an athletics 
 
172.  The First Amendment also applies to the manner in which a message is conveyed.  See 
generally, Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).  The government as regulator is not outside First 
Amendment constraints if it permits delivery of a message but dampens down the emotive force in 
which it is conveyed.  See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 407 (1989). 
173.  For example, NCAA sportsmanship policies prohibit coaches from using expletives.  See 
Jeff Rabjohns, NCAA Swears It Will Put a Stop to Coaches’ Cursing, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Oct. 22, 
2007, at A1. 
174.  Conferences also have these rules.  For a recent illustration of conference restrictions on 
coach comments―in this case of other coaches in a conference―see David Jones, SEC Coaches’ 
Remarks to Be Limited, NEWS-PRESS (FORT MYERS), May 29, 2009, at 2C.  See also Pedro Moura, 
Lane Kiffin Apologizes for Comments, ESPN LA (Nov. 2, 2011), http://espn.go.com/los-
angeles/ncf/story/_/id/7178722/usc-lane-kiffin-apologizes-point-ripping-refs (discussing the PAC-12 
imposing public reprimand and $10,000 fine on head coach for criticizing game referees). 
175.  Brentwood II, 551 U.S. 291, 294 (2007). 
176.  Id. at 300. 
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association and follow its rules.177  But the Court acknowledged that 
Brentwood had a First Amendment right to provide truthful information to 
prospective students.178  More importantly, to forge a distinction between an 
institution and the individuals that act on its behalf provides for easy 
circumvention of an association’s rules.179  The Brentwood II Court 
acknowledged as much in describing the effect of enforcing the recruiting rule 
as abridging the coach’s speech.180  Also underpinning the Court’s decision 
was its evaluation of recruiting rules as “nowhere near the heart of the First 
Amendment” and needed for the administration of athletics competition.181 
So long as an association’s rules are necessary for competition and 
removed from the First Amendment’s “heart,” therefore, the Brentwood II 
holding should insulate from successful First Amendment challenge the 
NCAA’s enforcement of its sportsmanship and other bylaws against coaches 
and athletic administrators.  This is particularly so, given that coaches at 
NCAA institutions contractually agree to be bound by NCAA bylaws.182 
C.  Student-Athlete Discipline 
As with regulation of coach and athletic administrator speech, discipline 
of student-athletes, including their speech, is the direct responsibility of the 
colleges and universities at which they are enrolled.  Courts defer to the needs 
of educators to abridge student speech that they believe would materially and 
substantially disrupt the academic environment.183  Even for universities, these 
decisions are distinguishable because they focus on grade and high school 
students.  That said, however, they nonetheless are support for the 
constitutionality of NCAA speech regulation.  Consider that, unlike the impact 
of NCAA bylaws, the rules upheld in the school cases permit schools to 
prohibit political speech at the core of the First Amendment.184  In addition, 
 
177.  Id. at 300 (explaining, “[F]ootball is a game. Games have rules.”). 
178.  Id. at 295–96. 
179.  Id. at 300. 
180.  Id. at 296. 
181.  Id. 
182.  NCAA BYLAWS § 11.2.1; see sources cited supra note 65. 
183.  See cases cited supra note 162; Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028, 1032–34 (5th Cir. 1975), 
abrogated by NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988).  They similarly give great deference to 
university academic decisions.  See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003); Regents of the 
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (plurality opinion) (explaining that “[t]he freedom 
of a university to make its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its student body”). 
184.  See generally, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) 
(involving students wearing armbands to protest the Vietnam War.  A distinction, however, is that the 
core First Amendment activity occurred during the school day and on school grounds). 
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consider that, unlike the status of student-athletes—who have no constitutional 
right to compete in athletics—the students whose speech is prohibited in the 
school cases have a right to attend school.  Even so, the school cases permit 
sanctions that may include suspension and even expulsion. 
University regulation of coach speech also lends support to the 
constitutionality of NCAA regulation of student-athlete speech.  Speech 
regulation of coaches and student-athletes shares the same rationale―fostering 
the ability to administer competitions, manage games, and promote the goals 
of higher education.185 
Additional support comes from the relationship between the 
constitutionality of speech regulation and the scope and severity of sanctions 
imposed.186  The only action the NCAA takes against student-athletes who 
violate its bylaws and policies is to prevent them from competing in NCAA 
championships or on university teams.  It does not require their universities to 
expel them from school or to return scholarship funds.  It does not seek 
damages from them for consequences attendant on their violation of NCAA 
bylaws.  It does not prevent them from enrolling in a National Association of 
Intercollegiate Athletics (NAIA)187 institution and competing in its events.  It 
does not prevent them from competing in national or international amateur 
competition or even from competing “unattached” in college competitions 
open to athletes not competing as part of a university team.  It does not prevent 
them from competing in professional leagues or competitions, whether major 
or minor leagues, or on European, Canadian, or other international 
professional teams.  The authority of the NCAA also is time-constrained; it 
ends at the point student-athletes no longer are eligible to compete. 
The NCAA also has bylaws and policies that regulate the speech and 
associational interests of student-athletes on grounds that such regulation 
 
 185.  See, e.g., NCAA BYLAWS §§ 31.02.3, 31.1.10; see also Public Reprimand and 
Suspension Issued to Lehigh University Football Student-Athlete, NCAA (Dec. 8, 2011), 
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Resources/Latest+News/2011/December/Publi
c+reprimand+and+suspension+issued+to+Lehigh+University+football+student-athlete.  Football’s 
“excessive celebrating” rule governs game participation.  See NCAA, 2011 NCAA FOOTBALL RULES 
COMMITTEE ACTION REPORT 1 (2011); Ben Watanabe, Excessive Celebration Penalties in College 
Football Are Getting Out of Hand, NESN (Oct.16, 2011), http://www.nesn.com/2011/10/excessive-
celebration-penalties-in-college-football-are-getting-out-of-hand.html. 
186.  Sanctions can include adverse personnel decisions, including termination of employment, 
fines, damages in civil lawsuits, and criminal penalties.  They also can include license or permit 
denials; see generally City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988); Freedman 
v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); zoning restrictions; see 
generally Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); and injunctions; see generally Madsen 
v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357 
(1997). 
187.  For a description of the NAIA, see sources cited supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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upholds the amateurism model of NCAA athletics.  The NCAA regulates 
student-athlete relationships with sports agents188 and prohibits student-
athletes from marketing their names and likenesses.189  It is unclear whether 
the Court would use First Amendment principles to oversee amateurism 
bylaws of a state actor NCAA, particularly as student-athletes have recourse 
both to statutes and state common law claims that may bear more directly on 
the issues.  There is little reason to believe, however, that court deference to 
the NCAA’s articulation of amateurism concerns in its enforcement of bylaws 
against student-athletes190 would change only because the NCAA now would 
be a state actor. 
In sum, it is doubtful that the NCAA faces much additional risk as a state 
actor were it to continue to direct bylaws at student-athlete speech.  If it does, 
however, then that risk already may be embedded in state common law and 
federal statutory claims applicable to a private actor NCAA.  If it does, 
moreover, then so too do the public universities that enforce NCAA bylaws 
and, therefore, a private actor NCAA will in any event need to conform. 
D.  Recruiting 
Of all First Amendment challenges, those to recruiting restrictions would 
pose serious problems for a state actor NCAA were courts to pay little heed to 
the recruiting environment and the need to curtail institutional excesses and 
third party influence.191  The Brentwood II Court signaled its understanding of 
the imperatives of recruiting.  All but one member of the Court joined a 
holding that a recruiting rule restricting coach speech was “necessary to 
manage an efficient and effective . . . athletic league.”192  The lone holdout, 
Justice Thomas, believed that the Court erred in Brentwood I by deeming the 
high school association a state actor in the first place.193 
 
188.  NCAA BYLAWS § 12.3. 
189.  Id. § 12.5.2. 
190.  See Bloom v. NCAA, 93 P.3d 621, 626–27 (Colo. App. 2004).  But see Oliver v. NCAA, 
920 N.E.2d 203, 215 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2009) (vacated by settlement). 
191.  See, e.g., Bob Hunter, Meyer Shows Big Ten How to Compete with SEC, COLUMBUS 
DISPATCH, Feb. 7, 2012, at 1C. 
192.  See Brentwood II, 551 U.S. 291, 300 (2007).  Recently, Mississippi State removed 
billboards (“Play With The Best”) deemed to be an impermissible recruiting inducement under 
NCAA rules.  Ben Kercheval, Mississippi State Takes Down Billboards, Says No Contact from 
NCAA, NBC SPORTS (Jan. 21, 2012), http://collegefootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2012/01/21/mississippi 
-state-takes-down-billboards-says-no-contact-from-ncaa. 
193.  See Brentwood II, 551 U.S. at 306 (Thomas, J., concurring) (urging the Court to reverse 
its earlier decision deeming a private state-wide high school association a state actor). 
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E.  Crowd Management 
The NCAA handles crowd control only at NCAA championships.  There 
are more than eighty-five NCAA championships,194 most with two or even 
three preliminary rounds.195  This number, however large, pales in comparison 
to the number of regular season games in each sport that are regulated by 
colleges and universities, not the NCAA. 
A state actor NCAA would be liable for crowd control enforcement that 
violates the First Amendment.196  A venue open to the public to watch athletic 
competition, however, is not a public forum whose “principal purpose . . . is 
the free exchange of ideas,”197 where speech regulation must meet a very high 
bar to pass constitutional muster.198  Instead, a sports venue is a nonpublic 
forum for speech purposes,199 permitting viewpoint-neutral and reasonable 
regulation of crowd expression.200 
Fans at a game hosted by a university may be unruly or use racial epithets 
or other offensive or sexually suggestive language.  Those enforcing crowd 
control may favor home team supporters despite the similarity of expression 
between them and supporters of the visiting team.  As a result, crowd control 
can be problematic for a state university, particularly if guidelines are so vague 
or broad that crowd control staff have insufficient direction regarding what 
they may do.201  Unlike institutions, the NCAA has no interest in privileging 
 
194.  See the NCAA championships website for the calendar for championships in all three 
NCAA divisions, 2011–12 Championship Calendar, NCAA (Mar. 29, 2012), 
http://www.ncaa.com/news/ncaa/article/2011-09-30/2011-12-championship-calendar. 
195.  See, e.g., Men's Basketball, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.com/brackets/basketball-
men/d1/2011 (last visited Oct. 30, 2012); NCAA Division I Women’s Basketball Championship 
Bracket, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.com/brackets/basketball-women/d1/2011 (last visited Oct. 30, 
2012); NCAA Division I Baseball Championship Bracket, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.com/brackets/ 
baseball/d1/2011 (last visited Oct. 30, 2012); and NCAA Division I Women’s Volleyball 
Championship Bracket, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.com/brackets/volleyball-women/d1/2010 (last 
visited Oct. 30, 2012). 
196.  It could not claim immunity from its constitutional obligations merely by sitting and 
administering a championship at a private venue.  See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 
U.S. 715, 724–26 (1961). 
197.  Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985).  It also, 
obviously, is not a forum historically and traditionally open to the public for speech purposes.  See id. 
at 802. 
198.  To regulate speech in a public forum, the government must show that the regulation is 
necessary to a compelling government interest and that it is narrowly drawn to affect that interest.  
E.g., id. at 800; Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); Hague v. 
Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515–16 (1939). 
199.  See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677–81(1998). 
200.  Id.; see Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at  46. 
201.  Vague or overbroad regulations leave room for unconstitutional enforcement.  E.g., Yick 
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one team’s fans over another’s.  Its issue is the extent to which it may regulate 
the content of the speech, even if done reasonably in an evenhanded and 
viewpoint-neutral way. 
Some answers are easy.  The NCAA may prevent speech likely to incite 
imminent violence202 or that jeopardizes the ability to provide a safe 
atmosphere for all fans.  So long as its rules are neither vague nor overbroad, it 
also should be able to regulate speech so as to create and maintain a game 
environment friendly to families with children.203  Otherwise, the 
NCAA―and the great majority of fans―will be held captive to fan behavior 
that drives to the lowest common denominator (crude and very rude).  This is 
particularly so if the only consequence for a ticket holder is eviction from the 
game; NCAA eviction policy is announced in advance, and evicted ticket 
holders are refunded the price of the ticket. 
VII.  DRUG TESTING 
The Fourth Amendment covers privacy interests in a number of contexts.  
The most likely challenge to a state actor NCAA would come from its drug-
testing program.  Given the Supreme Court’s drug testing decisions, these 
challenges should fail. 
The Supreme Court has upheld as constitutional random, suspicionless 
drug testing through urinalysis of Treasury Department employees seeking 
promotion or whose positions require them to carry guns204 and of railroad 
employees in specified circumstances.205  Most pertinently, the Supreme Court 
has upheld random, suspicionless drug testing of middle and high school 
students who seek to engage in athletics competition206 or, for that matter, 
extracurricular activities such as team academic competition, Future Farmers 
 
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886).  They also give inadequate notice of prohibited conduct.  
See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572–73 (1974); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 
607–08 (1973); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 532 (1972) (Burger, J., dissenting); Grayned v. 
City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 99–101 (1940); 
Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939). 
202.  See Terminiello v. City of Chi., 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 
296, 308 (1940). 
203.  For difficulties in exercising discretion, see Clay Bailey, Boisterous Fan Behavior 
Straddles Fine Line at FedExForum, THE COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Jan. 8, 2011), 
http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/2011/jan/08/fans-be-good-or-be-gone. 
204.  See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 677 (1989). 
205.  See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 618 (1989). 
206.  Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665–66 (1995).  School officials also may 
search a particular student or her possessions when they have “reasonable grounds” to suspect that 
they will find evidence of a crime or violation of a school rule.  See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 
325, 341–43 (1985). 
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of America; Family, Career and Community Leaders of America; band; and 
choir.207  Health and safety of schoolchildren is the governmental interest that 
justifies testing,208 even when the activity itself―academic competition or 
choir―puts no student at risk of injury.  The Court has described the impact 
on student privacy as “minimally intrusive” when drug testing is achieved by 
urinalysis through an established testing protocol and when the only 
consequence of a positive test result is participation ineligibility.209 
The NCAA administers its drug-testing program at least in part to prevent 
injuries and other adverse health consequences to student-athletes.210  College 
athletes are bigger and faster than high school athletes and may devote more 
time to training and competition.  Particularly in contact sports, their risk of 
incurring injury, and its severity, likely is greater.  The NCAA also has two 
additional important reasons for drug testing—to maintain a level-playing 
field211 and to assure that student-athletes adhere to the highest aspirations of 
athletic competition.212 
NCAA rationale for drug testing is similar to that proffered in the school 
drug-testing cases.  Its protocol mirrors that described by the Supreme Court 
as only “minimally intrusive.”213  Under NCAA rules, student-athletes who 
test positive are prohibited from competition for one year and lose a year of 
competition eligibility.214  They neither are publicly identified nor reported to 
law enforcement agencies.  The NCAA drug testing program in all salient 
respects meets the criteria articulated by the Supreme Court for a 
constitutional program. 
VIII.  THE NCAA AND ITS MEMBERS 
Except for its preferential treatment, bylaws, and policies, the NCAA most 
likely meets the constitutional tests to which a state actor is subject.  This is no 
coincidence. 
 
207.  Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 827–28 (2002). 
208.  Id. at 834. 
209.  See id. at 833–34.  
210.  See NCAA BYLAWS § 2.2 (2009–10). 
211.  Id. §§ 2.10, 2.15. 
212.  Id. §§ 2.4, 10.01.1. 
213.  The NCAA publishes a list of banned drugs and drug testing protocol; failure to follow 
protocol is grounds to challenge the result.  Id. §§ 18.4.1.5.2, 31.2.3.  Student-athletes consent in 
writing to random testing.  Id. § 14.1.4. 
214.  Id. § 18.4.1.5.1.  Student-athletes receive procedural protection, including the opportunity 
to appeal the duration of competition ineligibility to the Committee on Medical Aspects of Sports and 
to petition for reinstatement of eligibility.  Id. § 31.2.3.3. 
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The great majority of NCAA DI member institutions are state actors who 
are subject to constitutional constraints in enforcing NCAA bylaws and 
policies.  As an association, the NCAA is inextricably tied to the 
circumstances of its members.  Its bylaws, practices, policies, and programs 
operate because a majority of its members approved them.  Even without 
formal designation as a state actor, then, NCAA policy from which it, but not 
its members, is insulated from real and substantial liability is NCAA policy 
that cannot long stand.215 
This is the lesson of Tarkanian.216  The Tarkanian Court held both that the 
NCAA was a private actor not formally subject to the strictures of due process 
and that state institutions such as UNLV could be independently liable for 
actions they were obliged to take because of NCAA membership.217  In the 
aftermath of Tarkanian, the NCAA appointed a special committee to review 
how the NCAA enforcement staff handled investigations and the procedures 
applicable to infractions hearings.218  Thereafter, NCAA bylaws governing 
enforcement practices and infractions hearings were changed to comport with 
minimum due process. 
This also is the lesson of Cureton v. NCAA,219 a lawsuit brought by 
African-American student-athletes who claimed a Title VI220 disparate impact 
violation in the inclusion of a required minimum standardized test score that 
prospective student-athletes had to meet to be immediately eligible for 
competition upon enrollment.  Title VI applies to programs that receive federal 
 
215.  An example involves students and faculty at the University of Illinois who made contact 
with prospects to share their disapproval of Chief Illiniwek as the University’s mascot.  The NCAA 
limits the correspondence that universities send prospects.  See id. § 13.4.  When the chancellor tried 
to require that correspondence be pre-approved with the athletics director, students and faculty sued.  
Applying the public employer speech test to matters of public concern, the Seventh Circuit found the 
chancellor's action to be a prior restraint.  See Crue v. Aiken, 370 F.3d 668, 678–79 (7th Cir. 2004).  
The NCAA had informed the court that the Chief Illiniwek correspondence would not violate NCAA 
bylaws.  Id. at 680.  The court suggested, however, that it might have reached the same result even if 
the correspondence violated NCAA bylaws.  See id. at 679–80; see also Ronald J. Thompson, Due 
Process and the National Collegiate Athletic Association: Are There Any Constitutional Standards?, 
41 UCLA L. REV. 1651, 1683 (1994). 
216.  NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 196–97 (1988). 
217.  See generally id. 
218.  A special committee was appointed to review and make recommendations.  It was headed 
by Rex Lee, a former United States Solicitor General, and included as members Warren Burger, 
former Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, Benjamin R. Civiletti, a former United 
States Attorney General, athletics administrators, faculty athletics representatives, university 
administrators, and former state supreme court and federal circuit court judges. 
219.  Cureton v. NCAA, 37 F. Supp. 2d 687, 703 (E.D. Pa. 1999), rev’d, 198 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 
1999). 
220.  Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006). 
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funds.221  All colleges and universities, state or private, do; the NCAA does 
not.  The Cureton district court decided the merits of Cureton’s claim because 
it believed, mistakenly, that the NCAA could be sued under Title VI.222  Its 
holding that NCAA initial eligibility requirements had a disparate impact on 
racial minorities was vacated on appeal when the Third Circuit held that the 
NCAA could not be sued.223 
Courts historically defer to institutions in the articulation of academic 
standards for admissions and continued matriculation; students rarely succeed 
in challenges to these decisions.224  Describing the NCAA as similar to an 
academic institution in setting initial eligibility and other standards,225 the 
district court evaluated the legality of NCAA initial eligibility requirements 
using the test that applies to educational institutions―whether the policy was 
reasonably related to a legitimate educational goal.  One could argue that 
NCAA initial eligibility standards ultimately would have been upheld had the 
merits of Cureton’s claim been reached on appeal.  But that is beside the point 
made here.  Post-Cureton, an NCAA exempt from Title VI statutory 
requirements revised its bylaws to comply with a district court holding that its 
member institutions might be subject should a new court case be filed.  And it 
did so even though in such renewed litigation the holding on the merits might 
not have survived. 
That a member association must act in ways that minimize litigation risk 
for its members is obvious.  That a member association must hold itself 
subject to legal requirements to which its member institutions are subject 
equally is obvious.  In Tarkanian, the NCAA won, and it also changed the 
bylaws that Tarkanian challenged.  In Cureton, the NCAA won, and it also 
 
221.  See Cureton, 198 F.3d at 114.  The Supreme Court had previously held that the NCAA is 
not a recipient of federal funds for purposes of Title IX.  See NCAA v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459, 470 
(1999). 
222.  See Cureton, 198 F.3d at 114. 
223.  Id. at 118. 
224.  See generally, e.g., Bd. of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978); Tarka v. 
Cunningham, 917 F.2d 890 (5th Cir. 1990); Harris v. Blake, 798 F.2d 419 (10th Cir. 1986); 
Shahrabani v. Nova Univ., 779 F. Supp. 599 (S.D. Fla. 1991); Davis v. Regis Coll., 830 P.2d 1098 
(Colo. App. 1991); Susan M. v. N.Y. Law Sch. (In re Susan M.), 556 N.E.2d 1104 (N.Y. 1990); 
Tobias v. Univ. of Tex. at Arlington, 824 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. App. 1991).  Challenges to a grade or 
grading practice succeed only on evidence of serious wrongdoing by a faculty member.  See generally 
Keen v. Penson, 970 F.2d 252 (7th Cir. 1992) (discussing a grade imposed out of spite); Naragon v. 
Wharton, 737 F.2d 1403 (5th Cir. 1984) (discussing trading a grade for sex).  The same is true for 
academic dismissals.  See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); cases cited supra note 
112. 
225.  Cureton v. NCAA, 37 F. Supp. 2d 687, 703 (E.D. Pa. 1999), rev’d, 198 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 
1999). 
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changed the bylaws that Cureton challenged.226 
IX.  CONGRESS AS BOOGEYMAN? 
Perhaps the biggest imponderable for what the future holds for a state 
actor NCAA is whether Congress would be prompted to act.227  There are two 
things worth noting here. 
First, NCAA state actor status likely would be a two-edged sword.  
Consider subpoena power.  The NCAA enforcement staff can compel neither 
production of records nor cooperation of individuals.228  The NCAA has not 
sought legislatively-sanctioned subpoena power, in part from concern that this 
might trigger legislative regulation of NCAA operations.  A state actor NCAA 
might revisit the issue, concluding that its state actor status already brings 
increased possibility of legislative intervention. 
Second, and more fundamentally, Congress currently may regulate NCAA 
processes and institutional athletics departments through, among others, its 
interstate commerce power,229 its authority under the spending power to 
condition funds provided to higher education institutions,230 and its power to 
remove or condition tax exemptions universities currently enjoy.231  Every so 
often Congress holds,232 or threatens to hold,233 hearings related to 
 
226.  Member institutions bear the costs and legal fees when sued for adhering to NCAA 
bylaws and policies.  It could be argued that these costs should be borne by the NCAA, not the 
institution that happens to be singled out to be sued. 
227.  State legislation may offend the Interstate Commerce Clause if directed specifically at the 
NCAA.  See Potuto, supra note 6, at 270–72.  Certain state statutes directed at intercollegiate athletics 
may survive constitutional challenge because they have little or no impact outside state boundaries.  
See, e.g., Dan Fitzgerald, Connecticut Sports Recruiting: Law Helps Student-Athletes Ask the Right 
Questions in Recruiting Process, CONN. SPORTS L. (Aug. 22, 2011), http://ctsportslaw.com/2011/08/ 
22/connecticut-law-helps-student-athletes-ask-the-right-questions-in-recruiting-process. 
228.  Potuto, supra note 6, at 292. 
229.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
230.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.  See generally New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 
(1992); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
231.   See John D. Colombo, The NCAA, Tax Exemption, and College Athletics, 2010 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 109, 112; William H. Lyons & Josephine R. Potuto, The Federal lncome Tax and Reform of 
College Athletics: A Response to Professor Colombo and an Independent Critique, 2 J. 
INTERCOLLEGIATE SPORT 233, 237 (2009).  See generally U.S. Tax Code, 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (2006); 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).  Congress on occasion has threatened action.  
See, e.g., Congress’ Letter to the NCAA, USA TODAY (Oct. 5, 2006), 
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/2006-10-05-congress-ncaa-tax-letter_x.htm (showing full 
text of letter to NCAA from House Ways and Means Committee Chair Bill Thomas describing intent 
to undertake “broad review” of NCAA tax exempt status). 
232.  See Due Process and the NCAA: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004); Nicole Auerbach, Congressman Likens NCAA to 
Capone, Mafia, USA TODAY, Nov. 2, 2011, at 6C (showing how at congressional forum, Rep. Bobby 
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intercollegiate athletics.  Some are directed at institutional spending policy, 
coaches’ salaries, and tax-exempt sky boxes when tuition keeps rising.234  
NCAA officials even have been called to testify about the Bowl Championship 
Series (BCS), a conference operation conducted outside NCAA auspices.235 
Despite rumblings236 and an occasional hearing, however, Congress has 
declined to exercise the authority it currently has.  There are political, 
practical, and policy-driven reasons for its restraint.  Adopting and regulating a 
comprehensive code to administer intercollegiate athletics is time-intensive.  
To do it right requires athletics expertise, familiarity with campus life, and 
close familiarity with, if not direct expertise in, higher education.  The NCAA 
DI manual has multi-varied, interrelated bylaws.  Tinkering with one bylaw 
can be like pulling a string on a sweater, with the result that the entire thing 
begins to unravel.  It has been said that sports in the United States is our 
secular religion.237  Even Congress intervenes at its peril.238 
 
 
Rush, called the NCAA “one of the most vicious, most ruthless organizations ever created by 
mankind”); Ben Cohen, Big-Time College Athletes Ask, ‘Who's the Amateur?’, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 
2011, at C3 (describing hearings on college sports scandals initiated by Rep. Bobby Rush of Illinois); 
Associated Press, House Committee Quizzes Swofford, ESPN (May 1, 2009), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=4121294 (reporting that Representative Joe Barton from 
Texas introduced legislation to stop the NCAA from calling a game the national championship unless 
it was the outcome of a playoff); James Joyner, Congress to Investigate NCAA, OUTSIDE THE 
BELTWAY (Sept. 9, 2004), http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/congress_to_investigate_ncaa. 
233.  E.g., Kelly Whiteside, Conference Talks Expand to Politics, USA TODAY, Oct. 27, 2011, 
at 5C; Associated Press, Congress to Look Into ‘Deeply Flawed’ BCS System, ESPN (Dec. 2, 2005), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=2245440; Joselyn King, Manchin Wants Football 
Inquiry, THE INTELLIGENCER (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.theintelligencer.net/page/content.detail/id/ 
561095/Manchin-Wants-Football-Inquiry.html?nav=515. 
234.  See, e.g., Paul Fain & Brad Wolverton, Senate Will Review Tax Status of Colleges, 
CHRON. HIGHER ED., Nov. 24, 2006, at A31.  See generally KNIGHT COMMISSION ON 
INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, RESTORING THE BALANCE: DOLLARS, VALUES, AND THE FUTURE OF 
COLLEGE SPORTS (2010); KNIGHT FOUNDATION COMMISSION ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, A 
CALL TO ACTION: RECONNECTING COLLEGE SPORTS AND HIGHER EDUCATION (2001). 
235.  For information about the BCS, see BCS: BOWL CHAMPIONSHIP SERIES, 
http://www.bcsfootball.org (last visited Oct. 30, 2012). 
236.  See, e.g., Lee Davidson, Hatch Asks Obama to Have BCS Probed for Antitrust-Law 
Violations, DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake City), Oct. 23, 2009, at B4; Peter Sullivan, Amid Ailing 
Economy, Members of Congress Delve into Sports Issues, THE HILL (Nov. 13, 2011), 
http://thehill.com/homenews/house/193231-amid-ailing-economy-members-of-congress-delve-into-
sports-issues. 
237.  See A. BARTLETT GIAMATTI, TAKE TIME FOR PARADISE: AMERICANS AND THEIR GAMES 
14–15 (1989). 
238.  One area where Congress might likely intervene would be to adjust court decisions were 
they to further insulate the NCAA from liability as, for example, a decision that the NCAA could 
claim a state actor antitrust exemption. 
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X.  STATE ACTOR STATUS UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: 
SPILLOVER EFFECTS? 
A.  Additional Claims 
A state actor NCAA for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment need not 
be a state actor in other contexts.  Nonetheless, it is worth briefly considering 
some of these contexts, both to suggest a fuller landscape of what state actor 
status might bring and also to amplify understanding of the legal protections 
afforded to state actors.  With the exception of open records laws, all of these 
other contexts provide less, not more, legal scrutiny for a state as compared to 
a private actor. 
1.  Antitrust Immunity 
The antitrust laws prohibit unreasonable restraints of trade by entities with 
sufficient market share when they monopolize239 or act in concert.240  The 
NCAA periodically is sued for alleged antitrust violations.  Its loss in a case 
brought by the Universities of Georgia and Oklahoma241 foreclosed it from 
limiting university football team television appearances and has led to the 
extraordinary amounts of money now recouped by FBS football powers.242  Its 
loss in Law v. NCAA243 underscores the inability of NCAA member 
institutions to control coaches’ salaries through collective action and is partly 
responsible for the multi-million dollar head coaches’ salaries paid by FBS 
institutions.244 
 
239.  Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
240.  Id. § 1. 
241.  See generally NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
242.  See, e.g., Frank Fitzpatrick, TV Money is Still Driving Force in Collegiate Sports, Panel 
Finds, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 2, 2011, at C7; Ryan McGee, The Rise of NCAA Superconferences, 
ESPN (Nov. 2, 2011), http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/7181032/ncaa-rise-
superconference-impact-college-athletics-espn-magazine.  It has led, as well, to a shift of authority 
from institutions to conferences and conference realignment.  Fitzpatrick, supra; McGee, supra; 
Matthew McGowan, History of Conference Realignment Drama Comes Down to Growing TV Money 
. . . and Not Being Left out—As Big 12 Waits to Hear About Missouri’s Plans, Bailey and Others 
Discuss Reasons for Instability, LUBBOCK AVALANCHE-J. (TEX.), Oct. 1, 2011, at News; Iliana 
Limon, Conference Expansion: History Shows Many Twists and Turns Likely Before College 
Football Realignment Is Settled, ORLANDO SENTINEL (June 7, 2010, 6:00 AM), 
http://blogs.orlandosentinel.com/sports_college_ucf/2010/06/conference-expansion-history-shows-
many-twists-and-turns-likely-before-college-football-realignment-is-settled.html. 
243.  Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1024 (10th Cir. 1998). 
244.  See, e.g., Football Bowl Subdivision Coaches Salaries for 2010, USA TODAY (Dec. 9, 
2010), http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/2010-coaches-contracts-table.htm (showing 
the salaries of Nick Saban, Alabama, as $5,997,349; Les Miles, LSU, as $3,905,000; Mack Brown, 
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The federal antitrust laws exempt action taken by a state.245  They also 
exempt private party action expressly authorized and foreseeable by a state 
and supervised by it to advance state policy.246  Given how NCAA bylaws and 
policies are adopted and enforced, the NCAA does not now qualify for the 
state action antitrust exemption.247  Like most everything governed by 
antitrust, however, there is no bright-line test applied to decide when the 
exemption would apply to a private actor but, rather, a fact-dependent 
inquiry.248 
2.  Torts and Contracts Immunity 
A state not only acts in ways that only a sovereign can act, but it also 
engages in activities that are engaged in by private actors.  Unlike private 
actors, however, it is not similarly liable for breaches of duty or injury caused.  
Instead, states have sovereign immunity.249  Their liability is dependent on the 
extent to which they choose to consent to be sued, in what type of actions, and 
for how much. 
3.  What Might Be Wrought 
I know of no case in which a private actor denominated a state actor by the 
Supreme Court successfully claimed sovereign immunity in a contract or tort 
suit brought against it, and it is exceedingly unlikely that courts would declare 
that state sovereign immunity kicks in.  It also is unlikely that courts would 
 
Texas, as $5,161,500; and Bob Stoops, Oklahoma, as $4,375,000).  Salaries of coordinators and 
assistant coaches also have escalated.  See, e.g., Ryan Finley, Arizona Football: Rodriguez to Name 
Staff Soon; Stoops to Huskers?, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Dec. 3, 2011, at B1. 
245.  See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 631 (1992); Patrick v. 
Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 100–01 (1988); S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 
U.S. 48, 57 (1985); Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 
(1980); Neo Gen Screening, Inc. v. New England Newborn Screening Program, 187 F.3d 24, 28–29, 
(1st Cir. 1999); Charley's Taxi Radio Dispatch Corp. v. SIDA of Haw., Inc., 810 F.2d 869, 875–876 
(9th Cir. 1987); Saenz v. Univ. Interscholastic League, 487 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir. 1973). 
246.  E.g., S. Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 62–63; Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350–51 
(1943); see also Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 42 (1985); Cmty. Commc’ns Co. 
v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 51 (1982); City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 
410 (1978). 
247.  One impediment is that NCAA operations are too broad and multi-varied to be described 
as the consequence of particular, focused, state direction.  Another is whether a state action exemption 
could reach a private actor acting on behalf of more than one state. 
248.  E.g., Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 499–500 (1988). 
249.  Pursuant to its authority under the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress can abrogate state 
sovereign immunity but only for actions grounded in claims of violation of constitutional or federal 
statutory rights.  See generally Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). 
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declare a state actor NCAA exempt from antitrust liability, even with revision 
of NCAA bylaws to more closely match the criteria by which private actors 
qualify for the exemption.250  But the non-applicability of the state action 
antitrust exemption and the absence of sovereign immunity protection merely 
keep an NCAA state actor at private actor status quo ante.  The bottom line is 
that state statutes and common law offer more, not less, insulation from 
litigation for state actors as compared to private actors. 
4.  Open Records 
Through bylaws and policies, NCAA member institutions have made 
confidentiality as integral a component of NCAA processes as it is on campus.  
Institutional admissions files are confidential.  So too are prospective student-
athlete data submitted to the NCAA Eligibility Center.  Internal institutional 
decision-making is confidential.  So too is NCAA administrative staff 
decision-making.  Institutional hearings on student discipline and academic 
misconduct are confidential.  So too are SARC processes.  Institutional 
investigations of staff misconduct are confidential.  So too are NCAA 
enforcement staff investigations.  Institutional hearings on professional 
misconduct or the termination or discipline of staff are confidential.  So too 
are COI processes. 
Required openness of records is one area where state actors are subject to 
state legal requirements from which private actors are immune.  It does not 
necessarily follow, however, that a state actor NCAA might be more at risk for 
suit. 
State open records laws251 explicitly speak to official state entities, not 
private actors treated as state actors.  They also explicitly, or by necessary 
implication, cover only state entities of the state that enacted the statute.  Were 
a state statute to purport to cover out-of-state state entities, it likely would be 
unconstitutional in its extraterritorial effect.  Finally, state open records laws 
already cover private actors such as search firms that create, compile, or hold 
records for and on behalf of a state. 
In an NCAA infractions case involving Florida State University,252 the 
 
250.  Of all potential areas for state actor designation, qualifying for a state action antitrust 
exemption is one that the NCAA and member institutions would willingly embrace. 
251.  A few states have common law rights of access that supplement a statutory one.  See 
Roger A. Nowadzky, A Comparative Analysis of Public Records Statutes, 28 URB. LAW. 65, 69–70 
(1996).  In most states, however, open records and open meetings requirements are governed 
exclusively by statute.  Although the particular scope and reach of requirements may vary by state, 
most are patterned on the federal Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006), and have 
common elements. 
252.  NCAA, FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY, PUBLIC INFRACTIONS REPORT, NO. 294 (2009). 
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NCAA enforcement staff established a secure website by which Florida State 
could access documents.253  A Florida appellate court found the documents to 
be Florida public records because they were held in connection with state 
business and because a state entity had access to them for official purposes.254  
The reach of the Florida open records act is extremely broad.  It implicates 
constitutional privacy concerns as, taken to its logical extreme, it would treat 
as a state record any document of a citizen when reviewed by a state 
agency.255  The impact on NCAA investigations could be serious.256  But the 
Florida courts did not need a state actor NCAA to get there. 
B.  Additional Private Actors 
Should the Supreme Court deem the NCAA a state actor, it would depart 
from its current tests for state actor status.  The Court’s articulated rationale in 
the test employed to make the NCAA a state actor might also raise questions 
about the private actor status of athletics conferences and even private 
institutions. 
State actor analysis of athletics conferences would track the state actor 
rationale and analysis employed by the Court in designating the NCAA a state 
actor.257  There are important differences between the NCAA and athletics 
conferences, however.  No athletics conference is near the size of the NCAA, 
or even of DI, and none have a presence in even a majority of the fifty states.  
 
253.  NCAA BYLAWS § 32.3.10 (2009–10).  If a state open records law reaches to NCAA 
documents because they can be accessed through computers in a state, then the NCAA might 
maintain all files in NCAA headquarters in Indianapolis.  This would be inconvenient and potentially 
quite expensive for those needing access. 
254.  NCAA v. Associated Press, 18 So. 3d 1201, 1204 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
255.  Unless it is covered by an exemption in an open records statute. 
256.  There will be fewer witnesses willing to share information.  Potential leaks may alert those 
suspected of violations as to what story to tell and which individuals might be influenced to recant.  
See Todd Jones & Jill Riepenhoff, NCAA Has Ways to Dodge Scrutiny, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, June 
22, 2009, at 1A; Andrew Welsh-Huggins, Man Linked to Ohio State Scandal Got Death Threats, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 21, 2011), available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/oct/ 
21/man-linked-to-ohio-state-scandal-got-death-threats (explaining that an NCAA witness received 
death threats and experienced a major negative impact to his finances).  There is irony in the media’s 
position.  Around the time the media sued for access to the NCAA secure web site, a story involving 
the University of Michigan received media coverage.  The media quoted several football players who 
were not identified because they “feared repercussions.”  Michael Rosenberg & Mark Snyder, 
Michigan Football Program Broke Rules, Players Say, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Aug. 29, 2009), 
http://www.freep.com/article/20090829/SPORTS06/90829021/Michigan-football-program-broke-
rules-players-say. 
257.  BCS Conferences generate large revenues.  See Fitzpatrick, supra note 242 (noting the 
“aggregate worth” of the Big Ten, SEC, PAC 12, ACC, and Big 12 is $14 billion with an annual 
payout of $1.1 billion). 
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More fundamentally, athletics conferences do not enforce a complete 
regulatory code but, instead, supplement NCAA bylaws.  With fewer rules 
enforced, there are fewer areas of conference activity to give rise to litigation 
and even fewer to implicate constitutional principles.258 
State actor analysis of private universities would follow the prototypical 
state actor analysis in which private actors are deemed state actors because 
they enforce state policies and directives.259  The NCAA certainly requires 
that member institutions enforce its bylaws.  Combining a state actor NCAA 
with the traditional approach taken by the Court in deeming state actors could 
result in a private university also becoming a state actor.260  The obvious “out” 
is for the Supreme Court to exclude from state actor status any private actor 
whose status would derive from a state actor only deemed to be such, even if 
the relationship between the two fits articulated Supreme Court state actor 
tests. 
Were conferences or private institutions to be denominated state actors for 
all activities (conferences) or for NCAA activities (private institutions), it is 
unclear what would change.  Depending on how these private, now public 
athletics conferences and private, now public institutions conduct their 
business (hearings, waivers, adoption of rules, etc.), the impact on them of 
state actor status might be less or different in kind than the impact on the 
NCAA. 
XI.  CONCLUSION 
What everybody knows to be true often is false.261  The expectation that 
NCAA state actor status would bring major change is an apt illustration.  
Instead, NCAA state actor status will give non-members no greater 
opportunity to be heard in NCAA processes that affect them and no better 
opportunity to prevail in court.  A host of “becauses” explains why: 
 Because the NCAA already meets constitutional standards. 
 Because state colleges and universities already are subject to 
challenges based on their enforcement of NCAA bylaws and 
policies, and lawsuits are not happening. 
 
258.  The particular composition of conferences one to the next also may mean that some, but 
not all, would be considered state actors under a new definitional paradigm.  Those predominantly 
comprised of state institutions seem most likely to be treated as state actors if the NCAA is. 
259.  See sources cited supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text. 
260.  The one clear exception would be a religiously affiliated private institution. 
261.  In logic, a fallacious proposition called “argumentum ad populum” claims that something 
must be true if many believe it true.  See Philosophy 103: Introduction to Logic, Argumentum Ad 
Populum, P.L.E. (Sept. 25, 2009), http://philosophy.lander.edu/logic/popular.html. 
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 Because member institutions already may sue the NCAA for 
breach of contract (association) rights262 on the same type of 
claims and with the same burden of persuasion. 
 Because other potential lawsuits also are independent of whether 
the NCAA is a state actor and, at least theoretically, might be less 
available were the NCAA a state actor. 
 Because student-athletes cannot sue a state actor NCAA on due 
process grounds when they have no reliance interest in the 
opportunity to compete. 
And, finally, 
 Because the NCAA cannot long maintain bylaws and policies that 
subject its members to litigation risk just because as a private 
actor it is immune. 
 
262.  Student-athletes also may be able to sue as third-party beneficiaries to the contract. 
